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News from behind the **IRON CURTAIN**

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About this Publication . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is distributed to a limited mailing list of those who have expressed specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This bulletin is a compilation of material collected by the Committee for the use of Radio Free Europe and its other divisions and is being made available to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens who want to know more about "Communism in practice." The publication is not an organ of editorial policy; wherever possible direct quotations have been used with a minimum of connective commentary. However, the Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

About the National Committee for a Free Europe . . .

The National Committee for a Free Europe was founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens who joined together for direct action aimed at the eventual liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries. With the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee has set up, among other activities, Radio Free Europe. The Committee's efforts are focused on the captive countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these efforts the Committee counts among its active allies the democratic leaders—scholars, journalists, political and economic experts, and men of letters—who have escaped from the Communist enslavement of their native lands.

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Area Trends



LENIN once said that the "peasant as a seller of grain gravitates toward the bourgeoisie, to free trade, i.e., back to the 'habitual' and old 'primordial' capitalism of former days." Were Lenin alive today would he be surprised to see the new Communist concessions to these "bourgeois," "free trade," and "primordial" habits? The farmer and agriculture are the current focus of domestic policy and the pivot of all internal propaganda. Although "raising the material and cultural welfare of the masses" has become the slogan of recent months, changes are being realized slowly and they have been more obvious in agriculture than in light and consumer goods industries. The Communists have made it clear, even at their most "conciliatory," that they will not voluntarily disband the kolkhozes. They have called for greater Party vigilance on the farm; they have released workers to the kolkhozes; and they have sent new Communist cadres into the countryside both to present their point of view and to promote greater political control of the farmers.

What is in the making seems to be an attempt to secure the food base of Communist society, while granting as few concessions as possible to a higher living standard. What its purpose is—palliation, preparation for war, reorganization of captive country economies to accord with the realities of their economic base—is not yet clear. But of one thing we, and the captive peoples, can be sure: the Communists have not forgotten Lenin's dictum that where there is "a small peasant country, there is a surer economic basis . . . for capitalism than for Communism."

HUNGARY

Red Tape: Although on July 4 Prime Minister Imre Nagy promised peasants that they could quit kolkhozes if they wished, a recent decree regulating the conditions under which peasants may leave cooperatives indicates that voluntary departure will be exceedingly difficult. The decree burdens peasants who leave with so many obligations that they would be almost destitute if they did so. Further, the new regulations about dissolution of kolkhozes make it evident that a kolkhoz cannot be disbanded by a decision of its members but only if the government thinks dissolution or reorganization advisable.

Planned Economy: The third quarterly report published by the Central Bureau of Statistics announced that the industrial plan was fulfilled by 102.5 percent. However, this figure refers to a "modified" plan which is lower than the "revised" plan of 1951. The report also states that industrial production in the last quarter was 12 percent higher than it was in the same period last year.

POLAND

The Church: According to recent reports the Communists have taken new steps to destroy the Catholic Church: it is said that following the recent arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski, the Communists imprisoned the Cardinal's two auxiliaries in Gniezno—Bishop Lucjan Bernacki and Bishop Antoni Baraniak. The regime has explained its attempts to eliminate the present Catholic hierarchy by claiming that it is not fighting religion but "reactionary Bishops." This charge was levelled against Cardinal Wyszynski in a special editorial justifying his removal. The regime stated that the Cardinal had always been anti-Communist and was "more interested in politics than religion."

Economic: The government has given no indication that it intends to adopt a new economic policy. In a special press interview, Vice-Premier Tadeusz Gede complained that peasant deliveries to the State were not proceeding as smoothly as they should and that "hostile elements" had spread rumors to the effect that the government intends to

reduce delivery quotas. Gede refuted these rumors and insisted that all deliveries—grain, meat, milk and potatoes—be carried out.

BULGARIA

New Program: In line with its new, conciliatory economic program, the government has taken steps to relieve the peasantry. All the measures passed favor kolkhoz farmers. For instance, beginning January 1, cooperative farmers will be granted slight reductions in their compulsory state deliveries of grain, milk, dairy products, meat, wool and vegetables. Furthermore, income tax arrears of kolkhoz farmers will be cancelled up to December 1952. Another decree announcing cuts in peasant insurance premiums grants larger reductions for cooperative farmers. By giving kolkhoz peasants more privileges than independent farmers the regime has made it clear that collectivization remains its main agricultural goal.

"Good Neighbors": Ever since Chervenkov's September 8 speech, the regime press has waged a campaign urging the resumption of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the United States. Communist newspapers have also published numerous articles on the importance of easing tension in the Balkans and of settling all disputes with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia by peaceful negotiation. This propaganda is designed to promote Bulgaria's admission to the UN and to undermine the Balkan Pact by establishing so-called good neighborly relations.

ROMANIA

Agriculture: A recent regime decree will distribute 448,000 hectares for cultivation. These lands are probably pasture lands which have not been integrated into larger farm units, or lands whose ownership is undetermined. Since the land

belongs to the third and fourth category of fertility, the costs of its crop will undoubtedly be high because of the poor quality soil. The decree is intended to increase the area under cultivation and thus to raise agricultural production.

Personnel Changes: Recent changes in top government personnel indicate the regime will undergo a gradual shakeup. This differs from the sudden reorganizations which took place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Following the dismissal of Deputy Premier George Vidrascu, three other ministers were removed from their posts: Minister of the Metallurgic Industry Carol Loncear, Minister for Food Dumitru Diaconescu, and Minister of Meat, Fish and Milk Production Pascu Stefanescu.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Soft Voice: In a recent speech President Zapotocky insisted that the "socialization" of agriculture must be achieved by persuasion and that ruthless collectivization should be condemned as a deviation from true Soviet policy. This address may have encouraged farmers to strengthen their own position by passive resistance. This attitude was suggested by large-scale failures to fulfill plan targets for autumn farm work. However, if this means that the government will have trouble with farmers, it also means that the people will be burdened by severe food shortages.

The New Policy: In line with the new domestic program recently proclaimed in the Soviet orbit, the government is issuing a barrage of propaganda aimed at boosting the quality and quantity of consumer goods. However, few concrete concessions have been made so far and the loudly publicized price cuts entail only small actual benefits. The consumer is still burdened to an extent which will hardly inspire him to greater work efforts.

Spy Boxes

According to reports from refugees, mail boxes painted silver gray—to distinguish them from the regular blue mail boxes—have been installed in various parts of Prague by the State Security Police. Informers wishing to "expose enemies of the people" have been invited to make their complaints known to the police by submitting information in these boxes.

The Big Fall Sales Campaign

FIVE months after the Czechoslovak and East German uprisings, what the Kremlin braintrust seems to have ordered for its ailing and restive empire is a gigantic, minutely organized and dynamically conducted sales campaign. Broadly speaking, the "product" to be sold has not changed, but the wrappings have. The content is still faith in the future of Communism, or as an October 5 *Rude Pravo* editorial guidance to Party agitprop men put it: "The basic superiority of our People's Democratic order over the capitalist system must be shown again and again. . . . Party propaganda must fight emphatically against the great variety of expressions of social democracy, denouncing this ideology hostile to the working class and, with the help of detailed examples and experience, teach Party members and all working people to usmask all its expressions and protagonists."

More specifically, the economic goal of the sales campaign is to stabilize agriculture: to get farmers (within the kolkhoz if possible, but get them in any case) to produce enough food and agricultural raw materials to pacify the industrial workers who in every instance have gone into the streets in actual uprising. The political goal is to give the appearance of conciliation (without abandoning basic Communist objectives) and thereby convince the urban populations that revolt is unnecessary and rural populations that cooperation with the State is, at the very least, to their immediate material advantage (if not to their ultimate good).

The main body of the Party's East European sales force—agitators, "educators," activists, trade union officials, kolkhoz chairmen, local "people's committees," and the like—have received specific instructions on how to go about selling the new political package, and in many cases have already been dispersed for special duty in the countryside. *Szabad Nep*, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, *Rude Pravo* and other members of the controlled press chorus have echoed the Moscow *Pravda* lead* in running editorials urging more constant and energetic "political enlightenment of the masses" by Party organs. This exhortation is not new to captive Europe; what is new, however, is the areawide crescendo reached in recent weeks** and the specific sales techniques which are being applied.

The bludgeoning tactics of pre-Pilsen and pre-Brandenburger Tor days still occur but the two authorized angles of current sales talk are what may be called "Group Cajolery" and "Individual Involvement." These techniques supplement one another and are sometimes inextricably combined. Nevertheless, there is enough distinctness for each to merit separate consideration.

* On October 3, *Pravda* wrote: "Agricultural success requires an all-round intensification of the organizational political work of Party groups among the masses."

** During the last weeks *Rude Pravo*, to cite one example, has run at least three editorials on this subject: on September 28, October 5 and October 15.

Group Cajolery:

This tactic is calculated to convince wavering or recalcitrant citizens that the misery, oppression and fear under which they have lived for years has nothing to do with "true" Communism, with the genuine "Leninist brand" now being offered under the aegis of "collective leadership."*

"Optical democracy" has been plugged in a variety of ways. "The people must be persuaded," *Rude Pravo* stated on October 5, "that all shortcomings must be eliminated." On October 12, *Szabad Nep* called for improvement in applying "the principle of democracy in producers' cooperatives." At about the same time, *Zemedeľske Noviny* warned redemption office managers that they must "tender advice and persuasion and should not wrong farmers in assessments or weight determinations." An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, read over Radio Sofia on October 20, called "concern for improving the material and cultural welfare of the working class" a "first-rate task of the trade unions."

These and other editorials in the confessional vein are one aspect of the current voluminous upsurge in "criticism and self-criticism" offered to convince the captive peoples that arbitrary force, administrative blundering and neglect of the general welfare are past mistakes easily rectifiable. In the opening paragraph of a six-page, single-spaced reply to a farmer's letter, published on September 21 in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said: "You act correctly when you write me sincerely about the things that trouble you, things that you consider wrong and unfair. You are writing the way you feel and see things, without any circumlocution. Such letters are most precious." Such letters are indeed precious to the Satellite regimes not only because they bring resentments into the open, thus acting as a safety valve, but also because they signify the writer's tacit acceptance that the regime can be dealt with.

In answering grass roots complaints, Communist leadership has been careful to place the blame, not on the people themselves, nor on the "system," but on the group the ordinary citizen would hate the most: his immediate boss, the local manager or chairman or unit representative. In some countries, cajoling has taken the even more drastic step of a shakeup in the top echelons of Party and Governmental leadership, notably in Czechoslovakia where Rais, Nepomucky, Bacilek, Cullen and others who embodied the regime's most hated policies were deliberately moved into the background of political activities.

* In this connection it is interesting to note that the 15th anniversary of Stalin's *Short History of the Communist Party* was virtually ignored by Soviet propaganda compared to its past October treatments. Also the October 5 anniversary of his last public speech was briefly noted only by the Romanian Home Service radio and an article in Hungary's *Szabad Nep*. In general, Stalin's name has disappeared from the press and radio, although interestingly enough, collected editions of Stalin's work were just issued in Communist China and Stalin's 19th Party Congress speech reprinted in Czechoslovakia.

Individual Involvement:

In all the countries in the Soviet orbit, the Communists have followed cajolery with a variety of concrete concessions to higher living standards, using this as a springboard for employing the Individual Involvement technique. The principle behind this technique is simple: involve a citizen in physical effort for his own welfare and in so doing attempt to neutralize him ideologically, or at the least, keep him passive. Just as writing a letter of complaint implies that the writer feels that the regime is legitimate and that he has a chance of negotiating with it, so accepting, working with and benefitting from concessions (even minor ones) will appear to be an endorsement, or at least passive cooperation, of the regime's program. With this underlying principle in mind, the program is being sold to the peasant as the key to larger profits and to the industrial worker as the key to more and better consumer goods, but to the Party cadres the reminder is that "Agriculture is the key to successful Communism."

The Involvement technique operates in three steps:

(1) Give a little: agriculture must be stabilized—that is imperative—but keep the basic goals of collectivization in mind. Keep heavy industrialization in sight, and where emphasis is necessary point to the link between industrialization and a rise in consumer supplies. Don't entirely drop the "kulak" smear but use it more carefully. Give other groups (especially peasants) a sense of importance and indispensability, but not at the expense of the industrial workers' pride in being the "vanguard of the revolution." Reiterate the need for farmer-worker cooperation in the common effort to raise the living standards. Don't let up on work competitions and raising yields and norms; instead, present them in the light of self-interest.

(2) Publicize the little you give widely and unceasingly ("On The Constant Improvement in Living-Quarters Construction": an editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 8; "Price Cuts Confirm the Care of the Government and Party for the Wellbeing of Man": *Rude Pravo*, October 1).

(3) Keep repeating that the regime has now done its part, the rest is up to the people themselves: that none of their hopes for more food and more and better consumer goods can come to pass unless they themselves strive for them as individual workers and farmers ("Now it is the turn of the managers and workers of the food industry: let them make better use through greater personal and active initiative of the increased opportunities": *Szabad Nep*, October 9).

Group Cajolery and Individual Involvement have not been applied uniformly nor given identical emphasis in every Satellite. The reasons for this relate both to local conditions and to the industrial and agricultural requirements of the Soviet Union and its overall scheme for the orbit. During the past few weeks, Hungary has had one decree hindering peasant departures from the kolkhozes and three decrees giving the kolkhozes themselves assistance. Czechoslovakia has had price reductions and Bulgaria has launched a farm expansion program. Concrete concessions were made to handicraft workers in Albania

and noteworthy speeches were delivered by Premiers Zaptokky, Chervenkov and Nagy. For the most part, these and other developments discussed below fall into place in the current sales campaign to sell the old brand of Communism, but with a new label.

Hungary

As part of its drive to make Party and mass organizations effective instruments for carrying out top policy, the Nagy regime continually denounces petty depotism in local Party organizations and harps on the necessity of improving Party work. (See October 1953 issue, pp. 7-8). In September, Party meetings were held throughout the country to discuss shortcomings in detail. The press not only deplored one-man leadership, but haphazard work methods, poor propaganda activity and neglect of cadres as well. On September 22, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) complained that many Party committees ignore the cadres in their districts and give them no aid. The newspaper also criticized Communist leaders for failing to guide mass organizations or to control production:

"Officials of several top Party organizations limit themselves to making brief visits to their districts, plants or cooperatives. They simply inform local leaders of their tasks or give them a good dressing down. However, these officials . . . neither give local leaders advice nor help. Comrade Hersits, Party Secretary of the Nagykanizsa Factory, revealed that the Budapest Central Party Secretary gave him orders on 36 tasks but never stopped to consider the ways and means of carrying them out."

In another criticism on September 7, *Szabad Nep* complained that the people's educators (propagandists) had failed to explain Party policy to the people, and that instead of expanding their activity, they had withdrawn:

"Several Party committees and Party leaders have failed to summon the educators or to discuss propaganda problems. Furthermore, they have not supplied them with the necessary material or arguments, or given them basic information on the new program: nor have they sent educators out into the field to give workers the incentive which is needed to repulse the undermining activities of the enemy."

The laxity of Party officials and people's educators is probably due to the fact that they are confused about what the new program will actually mean for the workers. If workers expect concrete concessions in the near future, Party officials are undoubtedly in no position to guarantee that they will be forthcoming.

Besides criticizing Party organizations, the government has also tried to improve trade union activities. According to a recent announcement, all Hungarian industrial trade unions will hold annual meetings and elections between September 15 and December 15. The purpose of electing new officers is to tighten trade union management and thereby increase worker discipline. According to the National Council of Trade Unions, "the workers must be mobilized in the interests of realizing the program of Party

and government policy." The Council also urged workers "to take an active part in the meetings and to elect candidates who are worthy and have earned the confidence of the workers." However, another aim of the elections may be to eliminate old-time labor leaders who side with the workers against the management.

The Party has also attempted to increase its ties with intellectuals, technicians and white collar workers. A number of newspaper editorials stress that the "intelligentsia" has greatly benefited from the recent price cuts, while others claim that the "intelligentsia" helped bring them about. For instance, *Szabad Nep*, September 10, attributed the cut in bread prices to the work of agricultural experts, and the reduction of machinery and clothing costs to the "strenuous efforts" of technicians: "Efforts of the scientist, the planner, the pedagogue, the artist, and directly or indirectly, every member of the Hungarian intelligentsia, have helped make the price cuts possible." The newspaper then appeals to the intelligentsia to "assume a leading role in raising the cultural standard of production in every field of socialist building."

Nagy's Dissuasion Tactics

Ever since the disruptive, mid-harvest, mass exodus from kolkhozes touched off by Premier Imre Nagy's July 4 announcement that peasants would be allowed to leave them "at the close of the present agricultural campaign," the Hungarian regime has been trying to stabilize the agricultural sector of its economy by a combined tactic of dissuasion and persuasion: making it increasingly difficult for peasants to call the regime on its July 4 pledge, and at the same time strengthening the kolkhozes themselves through a fairly broad program of government aid.

The campaign to dissuade peasants from electing to farm independently has been waged on both economic and political grounds. In a speech last September 29, Nagy said: "There are peasants who think they would be allowed to leave the kolkhozes by leaving behind debts and taking away assets. Such action was never intended to be tolerated, and if these elements attempt to resort to it, they will find out that the Government is resolved to foil them with a firm hand."

Five days later, on October 4, Agriculture Minister Andras Hegedus announced a government decree regulating the procedure for leaving or disbanding a kolkhoz. According to this decree, a member will not be allowed to quit until after the completion of the autumn bread grain sowing.*

Regarding rules and regulations for leaving kolkhozes, the decree contains two main provisions: one for the distribution of State reserve (i.e. poor quality) lands to departing members (see September issue, page 23); a sec-

* On July 11 Rakosi, updating Nagy's July 4 pledge by about two months, said: "Those who wish to leave the cooperatives may do so . . . at the end of the production year, that is in three months time, during October." This current decree raises the permission date to November 1, but does not amount to a new substantial delay.

ond for the payment by departing members of their share in the kolkhoz debt—including all taxes and arrears which had already been supposedly cancelled by the government (see October issue, page 15). A member intending to leave must notify the kolkhoz management in writing. On the management's recommendation, the general meeting of the kolkhoz is then authorized to decide all questions regarding the handing back of land, livestock and equipment contributed to the kolkhoz holdings and the settlement of all other issues arising from withdrawal.

The political campaign to dissuade peasants intent on bolting kolkhozes despite economic deterrents has gone through several phases, from screaming "traitor! kulak!" in late July and early August to the rather pleading, you'll-be-sorry tone which the regime has adopted in recent weeks. On September 27, Hungarian Communist Party Politburo member Mihaly Farkas, at a county meeting in Nyiregyhaza, said: "We shall organize such kolkhozes as will make the mouths of individual peasants water! Despite shortcomings, the Party and the Government maintain that cooperative farming is the only correct road to follow. The shortcomings will be rectified with the help of the kolkhoz members. Order will be created—and an undreamt of, prosperous life will be secured in the kolkhozes in Hungary."

Declaring that it would be neither understandable nor wise for a peasant to leave his kolkhoz now, Farkas added: "a peasant should use his sober judgment and remain in the kolkhoz, since the Party and the Government by remedying the shortcomings, are in fact justifying the peasant

who intended to quit and are recognizing his complaints."

What are the latest remedies? According to the October 10 *Nepszava* (Budapest), the Government liberalized the pig slaughtering regulation, by allowing both independent farmers and kolkhoz members, who fulfilled their quota and contractual obligations to the State for pig delivery or fattening, to obtain licenses for the slaughter of fattened pigs. No doubt this new decree shall be an added incentive toward increasing pig breeding. Previously, Hungarian farmers had resisted deliveries and had little desire to increase production, as he himself saw little or none of his production.

A further concession was reported in the October 18 *Szabad Nep* (Budapest). It stated that the Council of Ministers had instructed the Minister of Finance to advance a 100 percent credit, instead of the 50 percent previously in force, to kolkhoz members and private farmers for the construction of silos. In addition sufficient credit has been granted to kolkhozes to construct an additional 100,000 cubic meters of silo space.

Fourth State Loan

The Hungarian people were called upon by the Hungarian Council of Ministers to subscribe 1,000 million *forints* to the Fourth Peace Loan issued on October 1.

This is 70 percent less than last year's Peace Loan target of 1,700 million *forints*. According to *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), September 30: "A considerable increase in the material resources of agriculture has made it possible for the Government to reduce the amount of the State Loan. The new loan will be invested in light industry and agricultural production with the purpose of providing an immediate improvement in the standard of living."

This line is consistent with the regime's current policy of courting the consumer. If less savings are forced into government bonds, more cash is released for purchasing. The Communist press gave considerably less space this year to exhortations to "over-subscribe the loan;" and, for the first time, no list of subscribers from among the prominent citizens was published.

Scientific Congress

As part of its anti-West campaign, the Hungarian Government sponsored a convention of the World Association of Scientists in Budapest between September 12-14. First mentioned in the press about a year ago, the Convention was designed to "acquaint scientists of capitalist countries with true conditions in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies so that they can judge for themselves the truth of capitalist rumors" about the Communist world. In a speech to the Congress, French scientist F. Joliot-Curie, listed the Association's goals. These include: protection of scientists persecuted because of their convictions; the unity of scientists all over the world; and the formation of a united front against the use of atomic weapons. According to Joliot-Curie, "Science in France, as in all capitalist countries, serves only the interests of a few."



Headline: The Kulak Exposed
Sign reads: "New Life" Kolkhoz
Caption: "I quit!"

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), October 15, 1953

Soviet scientist Opanin summed up the main decisions of the Convention:

"We shall unite in the struggle for peace. We shall build an insurmountable barrier in the path of warmongers. America robs whole continents of their spiritual reserves. We shall assemble all scientists in a united organization. We shall eliminate the artificial barriers separating them and overcome deliberately created gaps. We shall not rest until it becomes possible for all scientists of the world to discuss their common problems."

The only delegate to the Convention who spoke in a different vein was Sir Robert Watson Watt, member of the British Royal Society. As quoted by *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), September 25, Sir Robert said, speaking on behalf of the free world:

"We scientists of the West have wanted to do our part in the interests of lessening tension. However, I would fail in my duty if I did not stress that we have anxiously been watching and expecting signs indicating the same sentiments on the part of scientists of the Soviet Union and the so-called People's Democracies."

Czechoslovakia

Promises to stop the policy of forced collectivization were made by Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky in a recent speech dealing with the government's future agricultural policy. Parroting statesmen in other parts of the Satellite area, Zapotocky tried to assure independent farmers that they would no longer be persecuted or driven into collectives. At the same time, he left no doubt that collectivization was the Party's main goal and that cooperative farms would continue to enjoy the same privileged position they have had in the past.

In one respect, Zapotocky's address differed from those made recently by top Communists in Hungary and Romania: instead of discussing mistakes made by too great an emphasis on heavy industrialization at the expense of agriculture and light industry, the Czechoslovak President expatiated on the theme of the "correct" Lenin-Stalin Communist agricultural policy. Speaking at a September 27 rally on the Stezery agricultural cooperative near Hradec Kralove, Zapotocky claimed that coercion in the matter of collectivization was a deviation from the true Soviet policy and must be severely punished.

In developing this thesis, Zapotocky referred to statements made by Gottwald, Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. He pointed out that in 1949 Gottwald had emphasized the necessity of creating a bloc composed of the working class and the mass of small and medium farmers. This, Zapotocky said, had posed the following question: "... how to carry out the change to Socialism in the countryside without disturbing the indispensable, friendly relationship between the working class and the mass of small and medium farmers." The answer, Zapotocky said, was given by Lenin:

"Only then, when we succeed in convincing farmers ... of the superiority of the ... cooperative tilling of

land, only then, when we succeed in helping the farmer by joint cooperative management, shall the working class, the holder of State power, really prove to the farmer that it is right. . . . The representatives of the government and the soviets . . . must not employ any coercion whatsoever. . . . [Those] who permit themselves to employ [direct or indirect] coercion in order to enroll farmers into communities must be severely punished and removed from work in the villages."

Zapotocky then claimed that the reason Czechoslovakia was having agricultural difficulties was that "many people have forgotten or betrayed the correct principles of Lenin's agricultural policy." In other words, Zapotocky tried to prove that his government's new agricultural policy was merely an emphatic restatement of the original Soviet policy, allegedly based on persuasion. "Persuasive socialization" is apparently the line which will now be followed: "We must carry out socialization, constantly taking into consideration the interests of the village population, their views and opinions and, I do not hesitate to add, their prejudices also. We shall overcome these prejudices by patient educational work . . . and not hastily by coercion and forcible measures."

Continuing in this vein, Zapotocky emphasized that increased agricultural production would benefit those responsible for it. The President apparently assumed he needed an authority to back up this statement also: "This was taught us," he said, "by Comrade Lenin, and was again emphasized by Comrade Khrushchev in his report at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on September 3, 1953."

Consumer Goods Reductions

On September 28, the Czechoslovak government announced that prices of 23,000 consumer goods are being reduced, bringing an annual saving of 4.5 billion *koruny* to the population. Price reductions range from 5 to 40 percent of June 1, 1953 prices. Among the thousands of items affected by the price reduction, however, only 39 food items were included. The more important among these are listed below:

Commodity	Unit	Reduction		
		June 1 Price	Oct. 1 Price	in Percent
flour, wheat (coarse) ...	kilo	6.00	5.40	10
flour, wheat (fine)	kilo	5.00	4.50	10
sugar	kilo	14.00	12.00	14
rice	kilo	33.00	28.40	14
tea	kilo	260.00	210.00	19
potatoes	kilo	0.72	0.62	14
jam, plum	kilo	8.00	5.60	30
cabbage, sauerkraut	kilo	2.60	2.20	16

Note: The average hourly wage of a Czechoslovak industrial worker in mid-1953 was reported to be 5.84 *koruny*.

Other representative price reductions (with percentage of reduction in parenthesis) were as follows: beer (8-23), preserved fruit (20), bakery products (13), confectionary products (5-20), textiles (5-25), soap (10-12), sewing

machines (15), underclothes (6), stockings (5-48), radios (10), jewelry (20), tobacco products (8-25).

Not included in the price reduction were the prices of some of the more important food items such as bread, meat, fats, milk, and eggs. The prices for many of these products seem to be going up rather than falling (see October edition, page 18). It has also been announced that the price of milk, eggs, and potatoes will automatically rise during the winter period, beginning November 1. On October 1 *Rude Pravo* declared that prices for meat could not be reduced, because this would inevitably result in an increase in demand which the government is unprepared to meet. As for bread, regime spokesmen exclaimed that if prices dropped any lower, it would be used as fodder.

On the basis of current price reductions, measured in terms of a 37-item consumer basket, it is estimated that the real wages of the Czechoslovak industrial worker have risen 6 percent since June 1. The July 1953 issue of the United Nation's *Economic Bulletin for Europe* reported that the real wages of the Czechoslovak industrial worker had dropped 10 percent since 1952, as a result of the June 1 currency reform. Taking this figure into consideration, it is estimated that the Czechoslovak industrial worker's real wages are still 4 percent below that of 1952.

The bait having been laid, the Government leaves further improvement in the standard of living squarely on the shoulders of the consumer. The September 29 *Rude Pravo* states:

"Our workers will respond to the Party and Government decree on retail prices by stepping up their initiative in the Socialist competition movement, raising the productivity of labor, and intensifying the fight for an expansion of our society's wealth. . . . While the Government . . . regards the well being of the workers as its overriding aim, the necessary conditions will first have to be created before new price cuts can take place. These are: first, increased output, because lower prices mean increased consumption, and second, the need for the State to gather sufficient financial reserves with which to finance further price reductions."

Reorganization of Top Party Organs

Elections to the Communist Party Organizational Secretariat were held at a recent Central Committee meeting: as announced by *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 14, Antonin Novotny was made First Secretary and Bruno Kochler, Bedrich Pexa-Voda, Vaclav Pasek and Vratislav Krutina were made regular secretaries. The Central Committee also promoted alternate member Josef Tesla to a full member and elected him a Presidium member as well. The reasons for Tesla's promotion were revealed at the end of the month. On September 30 it was announced that Gustav Kliment, aging Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council, had been granted a prolonged sick leave, and that the Council had asked the Central Committee to release one of its "outstanding economists" to direct trade unions in Kliment's absence.* The man chosen

to replace him in the post was Tesla.

The present five-member Organizational Secretariat replaces a larger body. Former members Vaclav David and Jindrich Uher have become, respectively, Foreign Minister and Minister of Agriculture. Erstwhile member Frantisek Pexa-Voda continues as an ideological worker and member of the editorial board of *Nova Mysl*, the official Party review of Marxism-Leninism. Richard Hradec is now chief of the Office of the Government Presidium, and Frantisek Necasek, who was Gottwald's cultural adviser and ghostwriter, seems to be devoting himself exclusively to Party literary tasks. Anna Baramova and Juraj Salga, two relative non-entities appointed in February 1953, have apparently been relegated to minor posts.

No changes were reported in the Political Secretariat which, according to available information, now consists of Zapotocky, Siroky, Jaromir Dolansky, Karol Bacilek, Alexej Cepicka, Vaclav Kopecky and Antonin Novotny.

Taking its cue from the Central Committee session, the Cabinet reorganized the Slovak Board of Commissioners, national organ of governmental and executive power in Slovakia. This reorganization involved personnel changes which were made public on September 24. Ondrej Klokoc, former Commissioner of Education and Enlightenment, was made Commissioner of Culture; Jozef Lukacovic, until now Commissioner of the Building Industry, has taken over the new Commissariat of Building; Jozef Gajdosik, Commissioner of Building Materials, has taken over direction of the new Commissariat of Local Economy; Stefan Gazik, Commissioner of Light Industry, has been switched to the Commissariat of Agriculture; former Minister of Education and Enlightenment, Ernest Sykora, has returned to the Commissariat of Education; and Deputy Minister of Engineering, Samuel Takac, has been appointed Commissioner of Light Industry.

The only major victim of the shakeup in Slovakia is Marek Culen, formerly Commissioner of Agriculture. His elimination corresponds to that of his superior, Agriculture Minister Jozef Nepomucky. Both Nepomucky and Culen were known as forceful collectivizers and have been removed from the leading posts to make way for the new, "moderate" agricultural policy. It should be mentioned, however, that Nepomucky has now become Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

The following complaint was discovered in the September 3 issue of *Svet Prace* ("World of Labor"), published in Prague:

"Professor Travnicek published a dictionary of the Czech language in which there is a good deal of incorrectness and incompleteness. The dictionary, therefore, needs a good appendix; at random—in the 1946 edition the definition for 'kulak' is 'a small landowner and an enemy of the Soviets' . . ."

* On October 22 Radio Prague reported that Kliment had died.

Bulgaria

As in other countries of the Soviet bloc, the Bulgarian regime has attempted to increase agricultural production by offering concessions to the farmers. The keynote of this program was in Prime Minister Chervenkov's September 8 speech. Among the more important provisions were:

1) A more realistic approach is to be taken in computing quotas for state milk deliveries. Compulsory delivery quotas for cow and buffalo milk are to be reduced 20 to 30 percent for kolkhozes and 50 percent for livestock privately owned by kolkhoz members.

2) Wool delivery quotas for private farmers with herds of more than 15 head are to be reduced. Wool quotas are to be reduced 6 to 7 percent for kolkhozes and 10 to 12 percent for kolkhoz members. The purchase price for merino wool is to be increased 30 percent.

3) A new system of meat deliveries is to be put into effect on January 1, 1954. Meat norms for kolkhozes are to be reduced so that they are 40 to 50 percent below those for independent farmers.

4) Irrigation taxes already owed by kolkhozes and kolkhoz members are to be reduced 40 percent. Kolkhozes and private farmers are to be completely relieved of taxes on water consumption from sources not included in the State irrigation and drainage system and for which maintenance expenditures are not required. Kolkhozes are to be relieved of irrigation taxes for the first two years after the establishment of a new irrigation system.

5) Obligatory insurance premiums for kolkhozes and kolkhoz members are to be reduced by 10 percent and voluntary premiums by 15 percent. Insurance premiums on buildings are to be reduced 30 percent.

6) No tax is to be levied on kolkhoz income used for purchase of insecticides, fertilizer, sowing seed, fodder, or for expenditures resulting from natural calamities, or used for charitable purposes.

7) In border districts, norms established for milk, meat and cereal deliveries are to be set at 30 percent below those required for the rest of the country.

8) The tax on income from rented land is to be paid by kolkhoz members. The income from personal plots of kolkhoz members is to be taxed according to the general tax schedule of 5 to 20 *leva* per decare. Taxes are to be based on the area and category of the land, irrespective of the crop sown on it.

9) Credits will be granted by the Bulgarian Investment Bank to farmers and kolkhozes for planned construction expenditures. In addition, the bank will make 20 million *leva* available for three year credits to kolkhozes without means. The Bulgarian National Bank is authorized to extend short term credits to kolkhozes during the second six months of every year for purchasing seed, fertilizer, and other necessary items for the following year's crop. A three-year moratorium on overdue loans to kolkhozes, including those due to expire in 1953-1954, will be granted by the Bulgarian National Bank. Kolkhoz deficits due to the 1952 monetary reform are to be cancelled.

10) Total aid to be granted to the kolkhozes during 1953-1954 will amount to 600 million *leva*. In the next few years, it is estimated that this aid will exceed 150 million *leva* plus an additional 100 million *leva* in State facilities.

Further concessions to kolkhozes and kolkhoz members were announced in the October 13 *Otechestven Front* (Sofia). According to this decree, the following debts due for the period up to and including December 31, 1952, were cancelled: all arrears on income taxes, State and local taxes, fines on kolkhoz members, insurance premiums, payments due to machine-tractor stations, and drainage, irrigation and flood control debts. Further, building payment arrears for kolkhozes, kolkhoz members and individual farmers which were owed to farmer water syndicates were also cancelled.

The Farm Expansion Program

On October 13, 1953, the Bulgarian radio announced the Communist Party's farm expansion program. The following provisions were outlined as the principal objectives in the field of agriculture:

1) State agricultural investments during the second Five Year Plan shall be Double the amount appropriated for agriculture during the first Five Year Plan.

2) To reach this goal, the following steps shall be taken: by the end of 1957, the total number of horned cattle shall be 2.09 million, of which cows are to number 700,000; goats and sheep 8.7 million; pigs 2.2 million; and poultry 8 million.

3) The land area sown with fodder crops in 1954 shall be extended by at least 100,000 hectares.

4) The forestry board shall supply the Agricultural Ministry in 1954 with 500,000 hectares of pasture land from the highlands and forest lands, which will serve as a State pasture reserve.

5) The balance of the proposals were concerned with increasing yield per hectare, increasing animal husbandry, and expanding plowing, harvesting and threshing programs.

Principal emphasis is being placed on increasing meat, dairy and wool products, which might be interpreted as a move toward raising the consumer's standard of living, but there is no sign that the Communists intend to ease collectivization in Bulgaria. On the contrary, throughout the new proposals, kolkhozes and kolkhoz members are heavily favored.

Friendship Month

A new type of panslavic propaganda was released by the Bulgarian government for Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Month. Coming at the present time, this new emphasis on the historic brotherhood of Bulgarians and Russians is clearly an attempt to offset the strong impression made by the Balkan Pact on the Bulgarian nation. Usually, friendship propaganda is limited to extolling Soviet aid, leadership and technique. Now, this has been suppl-

mented by reminders of the traditional ties of friendship between Bulgaria and Russia, and of Bulgaria's support of the Russian Revolution "as if it were her own."

In a long article published on September 8, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mincho Neichev warned the West that any effort to weaken Bulgarian devotion to Russia is useless. The Minister insisted that "no storm can shake this deep conviction—namely, that our historic road is to go hand in hand in constant, unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union."

In elaborating on this theme, Neichev summoned up the names of Bulgarian patriots Rakovski, Karavelov and Botev, who led the 19th Century national liberation movement, and claimed that they were ardent friends of the Russian people. The Bulgarian Communists, Neichev said, as "faithful disciples" of these patriots, "continued, expanded and strengthened our people's friendship with the liberator—Russia."

The Foreign Minister then stated that in the future this friendship must reach a "higher ideological level" because it is the cornerstone of Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy. However, Neichev carefully failed to point out that patriot Rakovski is known for stating the following: "For the liberation of our Fatherland, we seek the help of Russia and the support of all free nations. However, we will never agree to becoming a Russian province, as some circles in Petrograd may think."

Romania

In recent weeks, the Romanian government has introduced several personnel changes. Unlike the sudden shake-ups in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, these changes are on a small scale and seem to indicate that if the administration is to be revised, this will be done gradually.

After ousting Deputy Premier George Vidrascu in September, the regime removed Minister of the Metallurgic Industry, Carol Loncear. He was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Chivu Stoica, an old-time Communist and member of the Politburo. Stoica was formerly Chairman of the General Confederation of Labor and General Director of Romanian Railroads. Before his appointment as Deputy Premier, he had been Minister of Metallurgy and the Chemical Industry.

Other changes resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Food with the Ministry for Meat, Fish and Milk Production. The former heads of both these ministries, Dumitru Diaconescu and Pascu Stefanescu respectively, were removed and replaced by Petre Borila, former President of the State Control Committee. The removal of these officials may be connected with the Beria purge, but there is no conclusive evidence to prove that this is the case.

Election Decree

On September 24, the Romanian Presidium passed a decree on elections to the People's Councils—local administrative organs similar to the Czechoslovak national committees. The decree states that the Councils will be elected

for a period of two years instead of four years, as before. This will probably give the government greater opportunity to eliminate undesirable council members and to disseminate propaganda in election campaigns.

As in the earlier law of 1950, the decree prohibits former landowners, industrialists, bankers and the like from voting; however, the decree contains the provision that these people may vote if they have given concrete proof of loyalty to the regime. Taking into account the nature of Communist elections, this change in effect signifies little.

The decree gives the Councils a new task: in addition to guiding economic social and cultural activities, they must now ensure the active participation of the working people in Communist political life and in "the building of Socialism."

In discussing the future elections, which will take place on December 20—one year ahead of schedule according to the old law—*Scanteia* (Bucharest), September 26, pointed out, typically, that it is the duty of Communist agitators "to enlighten the masses on the democratic character of the decree, . . . contrasting it with the bloody dictatorship of trusts in capitalist countries."

Trial

In a trial which began on October 10, the Romanian government sentenced 16 persons accused of being parachutist spies. The defendants were allegedly dropped on Romania after being trained by the American, French and Greek intelligence services to carry out espionage and terrorist acts. Thirteen defendants were sentenced to death, and the others were sent to prison for terms ranging from three to 25 years.

In an October 10 commentary on the trial, *Scanteia* (Bucharest) declared that the whole procedure "unmasked the aggressive policy of influential US circles and the methods they use in international relations: 'Let the sentences handed down by the military tribunal be a warning to those who want to question again the sacred rights of our people.'" *Scanteia Tineretului*, October 11, concluded its editorial by stating: "These spies have been financed from the fund of one hundred million dollars which the famous Mutual Security Bill assigns for rewarding the best ruffians."

Albania

On September 27, 1953, the Albanian Council of Ministers decreed a new support program for small businesses and artisans. These new measures were one more link in the overall program to increase consumer goods production developing in the Soviet Bloc. Among the more important provisions contained in this Albanian decree were the following:

(1) The Government is to allocate funds to provide handicraftsmen with materials, such as plywood, tin, etc., to be sold to the artisans at State free-market prices. In addition, private artisans should also be supplied with scrap

materials from the State and local industries. Such supplies are to be distributed to private handicraftsmen only after the requirements of the handicraft cooperatives have been met.

(2) Smiths and other handicraftsmen should be encouraged to collect scrap materials for the production of agricultural implements and consumer goods. These products are to be sold at State free market prices. Handicraft cooperatives are to have priority in raw material allocations.

(3) Private carpenters should be provided with raw materials, such as seasoned wood, plywood, sawed wood, and scrap lumber, to enable them to produce necessary furniture for the towns and villages.

(4) Artisans, such as shoemakers and woolworkers as

well as housewives engaged in sewing, are also to be given access to industrial waste. Individual business men and farmers are to be assisted. Small shops may be opened where no State shops exist, but prices will be regulated by the State.

(5) Bakers will be allowed to prepare the kind of bread they wish and sell it at free market prices. Professional fishermen are to be assisted in purchasing equipment and permitted to sell their catch freely.

(6) The Finance Ministry is to work out a new tax law for small business men and artisans. In addition, it will be responsible for procedures to implement these new regulations.

(7) The State Bank is authorized to grant short-term credits to peasants and artisans.

Boredom

Communism has lost its kick, according to a Polish youth writing to Radio Warsaw's "Wavelength 49" program of September 20.

A young man working in Elblag, he devotes much of his time to social duties; he is a member of the ZMP [Polish Communist Youth Union], an activist and lecturer. He also works on the factory council, and almost every day he has a meeting, briefing, or lecture and returns home late. He is frequently so tired that he can spare no time for reading.

But he does not want to be misunderstood; he is not boasting, nor does he wish to shirk his duties. His problem is that he cannot rid himself of the suspicion that "in times past, life was more exciting. The struggle of the Communist youth was different, more romantic. Then there were dangers lurking at every corner." And now? "Work and meetings; work and lectures; work and briefings."

He knows that Poland's future is being forged; he knows about the tasks of the Six-Year Plan. "Nevertheless, quite frequently at work or at meetings, I am unable to overcome a certain feeling of boredom."

His father was a partisan in the People's Army during the war, and he has heard many stories from him of the fight against the enemy. He has himself lectured about the struggles of the early Communist youth organizations. By comparison, he says, his own life appears "humdrum." That is why he is writing to Wavelength 49, although his own problem is so dissimilar from those raised by other listeners who have written in.

In reply, the radio commentator denied that life can be divided into "heroic" and "uninteresting" segments, assuring the youth that there are still many enemies, many survivals of the reactionary past which it is the duty of every ZMP member to combat. There is still much opportunity for revolutionary struggle:

"An example can be drawn from Elblag itself; where, two years ago, a factory shed in the Swierczewski Works was burned down as a result of sabotage. It was a case of lack of vigilance on the part of the local ZMP organization. Since then the ZMP local has become more militant."



The Mitre

and

the Sword

"Antireligious propaganda is the means by which the complete liquidation of the reactionary clergy must be brought about."

Stalin

ON THE evening of September 25, Polish Communist police agents, armed with rifles and submachine guns, invaded the home of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. All members of the household were ordered to stand facing the walls, while a thorough search from basement to attic was conducted. Several hours later, the police left, taking the Cardinal with them. An official government communique confirmed the arrest: it stated that the Cardinal had been prohibited from fulfilling his duties as Primate of Poland and Archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw and that, at the request of the Bishops' Conference, he had been permitted to "retire" to a monastery. Thus, in a few swift hours the Communist regime struck its severest blow at the Catholic Church in Poland.

Although persecution of Polish religious institutions began almost as soon as the Communists took power, no time in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Communist State has been more tense than the present. In predominantly Catholic Poland (some 95 percent of the people), where the Church has established deep roots in the life of the community and has acquired an almost national character, the Stalinists have had to proceed carefully in their drive to destroy its influence—an influence which must be considered political as well as ideological in a State which demands total control over individual will and conscience. By 1949, after about four years of relative caution, the regime felt strong enough to hit hard at the Catholic hierarchy; since then, and especially in the past

few months, the attack has been waged with increasing ferocity. With this growing virulence, Soviet goals have become unmistakable: to sever the Church from the Vatican and the West so that it becomes solely a local institution; to gain complete power over the Catholic hierarchy; and finally, to convert the Church into a government tool.

It was with these aims in mind, as well as the specific character of its anti-Catholic campaign, that the regime formulated its charges against Cardinal Wyszyński. The Communists accused him of abusing his clerical functions with the purpose of violating the 1950 Agreement, of conducting subversive activities and "of creating an atmosphere favorable to hostile action which is especially harmful in view of the scheming against the integrity of the [Western] frontiers of the Polish People's Republic."

The Western Territories

The 1950 Agreement and the question of the Western Territories have become the battleground of the Church-State conflict. According to the Potsdam Agreement the "Recovered Territories," formerly held by Germany, were to be administered by Poland pending final delimitation in a peace treaty. The German population was transferred from the area and Poles from the eastern part of the country were resettled in the region. In 1945, the late Cardinal Hlond appointed a provisional apostolic administration for these Territories. The Communists, however, demanded

that permanent authorities be installed. They pursued this demand knowing that it was contrary to Vatican policy to establish permanent apostolic administrations in areas with no permanent political status, and without giving any indication that they themselves—or their Moscow overlords—were pressing for a peace treaty.

Playing on the people's patriotic sentiments, the Communists violently denounced the Vatican as hostile to Polish territorial claims, and labelled the Polish Episcopate an enemy of the Polish nation. The purpose was not only to discredit the Episcopate for upholding Vatican policy but also, if possible, to split the Episcopate from the Vatican. Tension was further increased by German Catholic demands that the Oder-Neisse frontier be revised. The Polish government seized this opportunity to ask the Episcopate to reply to every German statement—a request which, if complied with, would have led to a scandalous fight between Poles and Germans within the Church.

Finally, in 1951, the Polish regime took drastic steps. It issued a decree liquidating the temporary Church administration in the area and removed the priests who acted as apostolic administrators.* The Vatican itself, to avoid possibilities of a schism, permitted the election of new diocesan administrators by the clergy concerned. These administrators had the status of vicars capitular and were elected with a view to regime approval. Although the government accepted this state of affairs—at least for the time being—it continued its campaign against the Episcopate. Time and again the Polish Bishops have declared their solidarity with the nation on the matter of the Western Territories, but the government has only increased its inflammatory propaganda.

The Church-State Agreement of 1950

The springboard for other attacks against the Polish Episcopate is the charge that members of the higher clergy have violated the 1950 Church-State Agreement. They are accused of doing so either by engaging in anti-Communist activity or by tolerating and refusing to condemn such activity. The Episcopate has been given little opportunity to defend itself on either score.

The Agreement which allegedly regulates State-Church relations was signed after prolonged negotiations between the government and the Episcopate following the regime's 1945 revocation of the Concordat. According to its provisions, the Church is autonomous and the Pope sovereign in matters of faith, morality and internal Church administration. The Agreement also permits religious instruction in schools and acknowledges the Church's right to conduct charitable works and to publish Catholic periodicals. On its part, the Church is obliged to adopt a loyal attitude toward the regime and to denounce clergymen guilty of participating in anti-State activities.

If events preceding the Agreement made it appear doubtful that the regime would abide by its provisions, subsequent events proved that the Agreement existed chiefly as

a government weapon against the Church. It was signed shortly after the Communists had begun to wage their anti-Catholic campaign in earnest, and it followed such blows as the dissolution of the Catholic charity organization, *Caritas*, and the expropriation of Church properties. Furthermore, it was concluded at a time when the regime had already interfered in internal Church affairs by setting up clerical and lay organizations composed of "progressive" and "patriotic" Catholics to side with the State against the Church. The Agreement not only did not put a stop to such activities, but gave the government a pretext for continuing and increasing them.

This was clear at the end of 1952, when the Communists began a new attack against the Church. The goal was to remove members of the higher clergy and install in their stead Church leaders recruited from the lists of "patriotic priests" obedient to the government. This action was carried out by accusing a number of bishops and priests of violating the Church-State Agreement.

In a series of rapid moves, the regime arrested the Bishop of Katowice (Stalinogrod) and his two auxiliary bishops, then the Archbishop of Cracow and his auxiliary bishop. The former were charged with disrupting the National Front coalition by petitioning for the restoration of religious education in schools. The latter were accused of permitting members of the Cracow Curia to carry on espionage and blackmarketeering. The "subversive priests" from the Cracow Curia were sentenced in a huge show trial staged in January 1953. The campaign was climaxed by the temporary suspension of the only Catholic weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, in March so that it could be taken over by a pro-government group and, even more important, by the enactment of a decree which gave the State the right to supervise clerical appointments.

The February Decree

As announced on February 9, 1953, the decree virtually granted the regime power to interfere in internal Church affairs. According to its provisions, the government had to approve in advance all Church appointments, promotions and transfers. Regime consent also had to be obtained for the creation, abolition or transformation of church posts and functions. Further, the decree required all members of the Church hierarchy to take a loyalty oath to the regime and stated that "any member of the hierarchy who carries out activities contrary to law, or who supports or conceals this activity . . . shall be removed from his post, either on the initiative of his superior church authorities or on request of the state authorities."

The obvious purpose of the decree was to fill Church vacancies with pro-government clergy. This was all but admitted by *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 13, which used the grounds of anti-State espionage as an excuse: "The decree ensures that only patriots will be appointed, that only persons who support the Polish State's interests will hold ecclesiastical posts. The decree [was inspired] by revelations made in the Cracow trial. It was

* The provisional heads of the dioceses.

adopted because we cannot tolerate a state of affairs in which religious institutions are used as centers of diversion and espionage after the pattern of the Cracow Curia."

The Bishops Protest

Needless to say, the decree paved the way for the removal of other bishops, including Cardinal Wyszyński. In response to the immediate threat directed against the Catholic hierarchy, and possibly in anticipation of his own arrest, Cardinal Wyszyński felt obliged to register a protest. This he did in a lengthy document, submitted to the government on May 8 and signed by the Polish Bishops. The document accuses the Communists of violating the Church-State Agreement, of interfering in internal Church affairs and of conducting a merciless anti-Catholic campaign. The Bishops also give a definitive reply to Communist attacks against the Church's attitude on the Western Territories and to charges that the Church has failed to denounce clergymen guilty of anti-State activities.

The 11,000 word document was immediately suppressed by the Communists and reached the West only at the end of September through unofficial channels. Its outspoken condemnation of Communist policy could have incurred no other reaction; for a document which states in no uncertain terms that the government is responsible for pursuing policies hostile to the people, and of passing decrees which are unconstitutional, can never be permitted to see the light of day in a Communist state. It follows that the authors of such a document must inevitably be removed. The arrest of Cardinal Wyszyński some months after the letter was composed cannot surprise anyone who knows totalitarian methods.

We Accuse . . .

The document begins with a detailed analysis of Communist violations of the 1950 Agreement: it accuses the government of "removing religion from schools and God from the hearts of youth," of encroaching on the younger generation's freedom of conscience, and of making it almost impossible for young people to continue their studies or professional work unless they join atheistic organizations. Secondly, the document accuses the Communists of forcing priests into politics, preventing them from carrying out their religious duties, and of attempting to sow dissension in the Church by sponsoring clerical and lay organizations designed to oppose the legal church hierarchy:

"[For instance], the so-called Commission of Priests with the Fighters for Freedom and Democracy was set up on government initiative for the purpose of conducting subversive activity against the legal authority of the Church. That group is composed of individuals called 'patriotic priests.' People who in their majority had the misfortune to infringe on ecclesiastical discipline or to fall into conflict with their Hierarchy are trying, with the aid of secular authorities, to 'clean' and 'reform' the Church of Christ. In the publication *Ksiadz Obywatel* they attack the Catholic Bishops and even the Holy



Caption: What was the point of their rebuilding the church, since we can no longer use it as a warehouse for arms and ammunition?

Szpilki (Warsaw), October 11, 1953

Father, proclaiming at the same time slogans and viewpoints which open the way to schism and heresy."

Third, the Episcopate bitterly condemns the destruction of the Catholic press. In no other field outside of education, the protest states, is the regime more ruthless in its efforts to destroy Catholic thought and culture. Catholic writers are expected to echo the Marxist press and to adopt its style, and editorial surgery on all religious articles is extensive. The censor not only alters titles and subtitles, but freely inserts changes in the text, removes the imprimatur of the Church and even distorts the ideological trend of publications and warps their religious character. Worst of all, the Catholic press is virtually disappearing. This, the Bishops claim, is no mere accident: it is being done with malice aforethought:

"It is disappearing not from want of thought—because it is not want of thought which causes so much trouble to the censors, forcing them to make innumerable and radical cuts—it is disappearing not for . . . lack of readers . . . not because of a shortage of newsprint, because there is no shortage of newsprint for publications which fight religion and the Catholic Church.

... It is disappearing simply because of orders from the top."

Patriotism Defined

The most interesting parts of the document follow. In a manner so pointed that it must have greatly embarrassed President Bierut and his colleagues, the Episcopate states its position on the Western Territories, the February decree and the Church's obligation to condemn priests sentenced for anti-Communist activity. Not only do the Bishops defend their attitude regarding the Western provinces, but they accuse the government of the same crime it attributes to the Episcopate—pursuance of a policy inimical to Poland's interests. "It is significant," the letter says, "that the government's hostile attitude towards the Church does not soften its edge even in reborn Poland, where it would seem that Polish *raison d'état* demands it."

"The press in Poland frequently alleges that Bishops are opposed to a new Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse. That propaganda is false . . . for it is generally known that there are no differences of opinion among Poles on this issue. It is also harmful propaganda for Polish national interests, for it weakens Poland's position abroad and helps the work of German revisionists."

The Bishops further complain that the government, and not the Church, is guilty of refusing to stabilize conditions in this area. For instance, the Communists removed provisional Church administrators in 1951 who "by their organization and work quickly created excellent administrative centers," and who, having come from the east with their parishioners, were a great source of comfort to them. This act, the letter states, created confusion, and was suicidal both to Church and State.

The Bishops then disclose that the Holy See had attempted to partially stabilize conditions in the Western Territories by appointing four Bishops to these provinces. This would have meant that although the dioceses were to remain provisional, their heads would have had Episcopal status. However, the Communists refused to permit these Bishops to take office and preferred to retain the vicars capitular, "thus promoting a temporary organization."

"When . . . the Polish Primate had obtained from the Holy See appointments of Bishops for Wroclaw, Opole, Gorzow and Olsztyn, who were to reside in the Western Territories, the government took a hostile attitude toward this achievement and did not permit them to take office. This did not stop the party press from heaping abuse on the Holy See and the Hierarchy, claiming that they were doing nothing for the Western Territories. It is exactly those Western Territories which have suffered most as a result of this singular policy of the State."

God and Caesar

The Bishops are even more adamant on the matter of the February decree. They claim that it not only injures the

structure of the Catholic Church but violates the 1950 Agreement and the Communist Constitution, which explicitly guarantees separation of Church from State. For this reason, they say, they cannot consider the decree legally binding. They point out, too, that while they consistently obey the commandment "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and to God that which is God's," it is obvious that "Caesar in this case is reaching out for things divine, nay, more, is usurping the right to reach out for them continually and systematically on the basis of his own authority."

"While issuing [the decree] the State Council did not invoke either the Constitution or any other law. And it could not invoke them because the decree is obviously in contradiction to the former and more general decree about freedom of conscience and religion, and moreover and above all, it is contrary to the newly-adopted Constitution of the People's Republic. For the Constitution introduced the separation of the Church from the State. And the separation of the Church from the State, as President Bierut, the main author of the Constitution, has authoritatively stated, means that 'the Church has its own autonomous organization and organizational structure.' How, then, is it possible that today, when the Church has been constitutionally separated from the State and isolated as an autonomous organism, the State can allow itself continuous legal interference in the Church's internal structure? . . . A decree which is in contradiction to the Constitution cannot be legally binding."

The Bishops go even further in expressing their disapproval: they declare that if it should happen that "external factors" make it impossible for the Church to appoint competent and proper people to ecclesiastical posts, "we are decided to leave them vacant rather than place the spiritual rule of souls in the hands of unworthy individuals. And if someone should dare to accept any ecclesiastical position from outside [the Church], let him know that by the same fact he falls under the heavy punishment of excommunication."

"Similarly, if we are given the alternative: either to subject ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the state, making it an instrument of the latter, or to bear a personal sacrifice, we will not hesitate. We will follow the voice of our Apostolic vocation and our conscience as priests. . . . We are not allowed to place the things belonging to God on the altar of Caesar."

Conscience and Marxism

Taking up another point in the State-Church controversy, the Bishops then accuse the government of creating conditions which make it impossible for the Church to fulfill its obligations under the 1950 Agreement. Communist police methods, they say, hinder the clergy from condemning in all good conscience priests imprisoned for anti-State activities:

"The government authorities expressed the desire that priests and Bishops issue sentences of condemnation to

ecclesiastics arrested or condemned by secular courts. But the Bishops were neither allowed to look into acts of accusation nor to hear the accused without restraint. Everybody understands that it is neither possible nor morally permissible to pass a verdict under such conditions."

In conclusion, the Bishops declare that the government alone is responsible for the deteriorating relationship between the Church and the State. However, they accuse nobody, they say, because enmity towards the Church is fostered not so much by the people with whom the Church must deal as by the Communist system itself:

"Responsibility for all this falls on the ideology of Marxism, on the doctrine which proclaims hatred toward people, which seeks vengeance on its opponents and creates divisions and quarrels even among brothers. . . . Religion is considered by Marxism only as a superstructure of economic foundations and, in consequence, as an instrument for oppressing the toiling masses. It is simply unbelievable how an ideology which claims to be the only scientific one and the only one based on experience, can make such completely *a priori* statements about religion, statements made without the control of experience, without comparison with reality, without caring that in so doing it runs the risk that this reality can give the lie to all these theoretical theses and constructions."

The Present Stalemate

The Bishops' protest reflects directly upon the removal of Cardinal Wyszynski. If the document was justified in the light of events which preceded it, its effect is even more cogent in the face of the events which followed. For the Communists charged Cardinal Wyszynski with violating the Church-State Agreement by failing to condemn Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce who, after spending over two years in prison, was tried in September and sentenced to twelve years in jail for allegedly conducting anti-Communist espionage for the US and the Vatican. The Cardinal took the stand he voiced in the protest: the government answered by interning him in a monastery.

Since the Cardinal's enforced retirement, both the Church and the regime have made public statements with regard to Church-State relations. Neither of these has been especially illuminating. The Bishops' Conference, probably under regime pressure, issued a declaration which stated that the Polish Episcopate would do its best to prevent distortions of the intentions and substance of the 1950 Agreement. In language equally vague, the Bishops commented on the Kaczmarek trial:

"The sad facts which were revealed in the trial of Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce must be roundly condemned. . . . The Episcopate opposes the linking of religion and the Church with selfish political aims of foreign groups hostile to Poland who are seeking to abuse religious feelings for political ends. . . . In connection with the government's decision to deprive Archbishop Wys-

zynski of his functions, the Episcopate, after adopting resolutions to insure continuity in the guidance of the work of the Episcopate's Conference, turned to the government to express its agreement that Archbishop Wyszynski take up residence in a monastery."

It is sufficient to point out that the Episcopate neither directly condemns Bishop Kaczmarek nor explicitly states which sad facts were revealed in the trial.

On behalf of the government, Vice-Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz formulated a reply in which he stated that the government stands on the principles of the 1950 Agreement, and will make every effort to normalize relations between the Church and the State and to guarantee the rights and duties of citizens with respect to freedom of religion and conscience. Cyrankiewicz, of course, omitted all mention of the February decree, making it clear that the government has no intentions of revoking it at this point.

Whatever the official statements, a struggle between the Church and the State is inevitable under the Communist system. What form this struggle will now take depends on the attitude of the government and the Episcopate. So far, the Bishops have not indicated whether or not they will rigidly adhere to the stand taken in the May 8 protest. It is significant, however, that until now Cardinal Wyszynski has been replaced in only one of his several Church positions—that of Chairman of the Polish Bishops' Conference. Michal Klepacz, Bishop of Lodz, has been elected in the Cardinal's place. Since the Conference is not recognized as an official body under canon law and only has the status of a working committee, this election is not conclusive. In any case, there has been no information about the election of vicars capitular to replace the Cardinal in Gniezno or Warsaw, although this election should have taken place immediately after the Cardinal's removal. The Church can either elect vicars capitular, or refuse in accordance with the attitude expressed in the Bishops' protest.

It is highly unlikely that the government will permit the Church to leave these posts vacant. And if the Church refuses to hold elections despite government pressure, the regime may very well claim another victim from the higher clergy on the basis of this refusal. In any event, it is clear that the last word has not been said on either side. The Church will undoubtedly make every effort to defend its position, and the regime in turn will make every attempt to install pro-government clergy.

A clue to the government's attitude is the recent report that Bishop Antoni Baraniak, Auxiliary of Cardinal Wyszynski in Gniezno and former Secretary of the late Cardinal Hlond, has been arrested. This arrest is said to be in connection with Bishop Kaczmarek's trial. Bishop Baraniak was criticized severely by both prosecutor and witnesses testifying for the State. If this report is true, the arrest is merely another step in the government campaign to destroy the Catholic Church in Poland—a campaign which, due to the singular position of Catholicism in the life of the Polish nation, can be expected to progress at fever pitch.



The "Privileged Proletarian"

The following account by a young Polish escapee was recorded in Stockholm early last September.

I AM what many people in Poland today would like to be—a genuine proletarian, the son of a poor washerwoman and an unknown father. I belong to that enviable class which, according to the government, is supposed to be "privileged." It was so "privileged" that I had to escape, though for three weeks afterward I sobbed myself to sleep with longing for my wife and children.

I know that I am not a particularly intelligent man, but I do have a few ideas about what is right and wrong. Maybe it's just because I am not bright that I cannot bring myself to do things when I am convinced that they are wrong. They wanted me to act in a way I knew was not right, and I could not do it and was forced to leave my wife and my family.

My mother died when I was still very young. The Dominicans took care of me and for some years I lived in their orphanage. Later I was sent to another school for orphans and poor children. A month before the war, I finished school and became a shoemaker's apprentice.

I was captured by the Germans, who took me to Braunschweig and made me work for the Herman Goering Works there. That was the first time I had to do something I knew was wrong, and there, too, I ran away. They caught

me as I tried to cross the river Elbe and threatened me with reprisals. Finally I agreed to work for a German peasant, but under no circumstances would I go back to work in the munitions factory. And so they sent me to a farmer close to Heiligenfeld. The only good thing about this job was that I met my future wife there. She is Polish too, and like me she had been sent to Germany to work for the Nazis. I fell in love with her almost immediately and together we managed to get through the hardships of the war years. We were married on May 20, 1945, with an American license and by an American Catholic priest.

At the beginning of 1946, we returned to Poland and settled in Gdansk. They gave us an apartment, consisting of two rooms and a kitchen, and I got a job in a government warehouse. Although life was very hard, I was happy. As time went by we had two children and we succeeded in making a little home of our own. I had never known what it meant to have a home. I was very happy indeed.

But there was a drawback. I made very little money and I did not want my wife to work. I wanted her to stay at home and take care of the children. I did not want my children to grow up with strangers—the way I had been brought up. I wanted them to have a mother who was

with them all the time, and a father, such as I had never had, who could provide for the family and kiss them good-night in the evenings after work.

In order to make ends meet, we rented one of our rooms to a very nice fellow, like myself not a Communist. We became friends and he helped me to get another, better paid job as a locksmith's apprentice. I did this for a year and then, again through the help of a non-Communist friend, I got work as a locksmith in the repairshop for cranes on the "July" Quay. I had advanced to the position of foreman of the crane section of the harbor, when I was denounced by an informer and fired. If it had not meant an entire upheaval of my life, the whole thing would have seemed ridiculous. The informer said I had been "negligent" with the cranes; i.e. that I was guilty of a crime amounting to virtual sabotage. I suppose that this man wanted to impress the harbor master by denouncing me. Anyway, the result was that I was removed from my job and shifted to the workshop. This meant a badly-felt reduction in my salary. My wife and I used to sit down together at the beginning of every month to figure out how we could manage in order not to starve. Cutting all expenses to a minimum, we could just pay the rent and food.

After a few months in the workshop, I applied to the Polish Merchant Marine for a job as a sailor. I suppose this was the one and only time I really profited by being a proletarian. I stressed this fact in my application. I submitted my application in September 1952 but I heard nothing until February 1953, when I was told that I had been taken on. I am quite sure that they employed me simply because of my proletarian background. I gave notice to the workshop at the beginning of March.


At the end of April I was mustered in. That very same day I was summoned by a UB (Secret Police) officer, who delivered a speech to me. He told me that I had been engaged on condition that I work for the UB. I was to spy and inform on my comrades on board the ship, and get contacts abroad. He said that I should keep my eyes open in Amsterdam in particular, because it was the center of anti-Polish agents. He said that spies who are parachuted into Poland are being trained in Amsterdam and he asked me to find out who is organizing the training and who is being trained. He further told me to take letters given me by Poles in Amsterdam back to Poland and turn them over to him. He instructed me to pretend to be a little reluctant to take these letters, in order not to seem too eager. I should also take whatever nylon stockings would be given to me, because, the officer said, the agents sometimes write their messages with invisible ink on these stockings or on those silk scarves which sailors like to bring home to their girls and wives. I was to get some extra dollars in order to be able to invite my comrades on the ship to have a drink and to make them talkative about possible contacts of theirs in Amsterdam.

The UB officer never gave me a chance to refuse his offer. He simply told me that my "UB-name" was to be "Wycior" and that I should telephone him immediately upon return from each trip abroad.

To be quite frank, I really did not know what to do about the UB's proposal. On the one hand I had to think of my family, of providing for them, taking care of them, keeping them out of trouble. On the other hand, the thought of spying on my comrades, of making friends with them under false pretenses, of reporting on them, frightened and disgusted me. I am not the man to do such things. I suppose it has something to do with what I was taught as a child by the Dominicans, and also with the love my wife has for me, which is decent and good. Somehow there was something definitely wrong in what the UB wanted me to do. It seemed to me as wrong as that other time, during the war, when the Germans wanted me to make ammunition to kill Poles and others with. Only this time, everything was more complicated.

The first trip took us to Gothenburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam. Even had I wanted to spy, I would not have been able to on that first trip, and the UB man did not expect me to. When I telephoned to him upon my return that I had made some friends he seemed quite satisfied.

On the second trip, we returned to Antwerp and were delayed there for three days on account of engine trouble. It was a long journey during which we also touched Sweden again. I was terribly worried, because I knew that I would have to return with a report to the UB officer. I was convinced that there were other UB agents on board and that they would report me for not spying. They would put down that I had been present when so-and-so cursed the Communists, or that I knew that some smuggling was



There were other UB agents on board.

going on, or some other thing. Unless I wrote a report to the officer, I would be fired.

I did write a report, entirely against my inclination. It was difficult and unpleasant, and I felt miserable about it. I hated myself when I went to the phone, and almost cried with relief when I was told the UB officer was out of town.


The thought of running away had not yet occurred to me. As a matter of fact, I made out all right on the ship. I had a good salary and, being used to hard work, I was even made a Stakhanovite and interviewed by *Trybuna Ludu*. But there was always the uneasiness about the spying within me, and even at home, with my wife, I did not feel at rest.

On the third—and, as it turned out for me, the last—trip of the ship, something curious happened, which made me decide to give up everything, even my wife.


In one of the Swedish harbors we visited, I noticed that the ship's Party Secretary seemed to be engaged in some very puzzling activities. One time he did not come on board for several days. And when he finally turned up, he was carrying several parcels and I noticed a gun sticking out of one of them. I was utterly bewildered and did

not know what to do. There was the possibility that, in order to test my loyalty to the Party, he was deliberately provoking my suspicions. But on the other hand it occurred to me that he might be a member of the resistance posing as a Communist. I thought and I thought and I thought, and I could find no solution. I thought of my wife and of my children and I knew that I would not be able to look into their faces if I informed on a man who might possibly be fighting the Communists. I lay sleepless for several nights, thinking. Thinking how hard it was to live decently and honestly, even for a proletarian who is supposed to benefit from Communism. Thinking how difficult it was going to be living without my family and how difficult it was going to be for them to live without me. Because by then I had already made up my mind: I would not return to Poland, where men are exploited.

I most humbly apologize to my wife and to my children. But there was no other way for me. My wife will understand; as a matter of fact, I already know that she understands and even forgives me. All I hope for now is that my children may grow up to understand and forgive, too. God grant that the day we all shall meet again is not too far off. . . .



The thought of running away had not yet occurred to me.



KOROWICZ

CHOSE

FREEDOM

"There is no doubt that the political defections of isolated individuals, however outstanding they may be and however significant their contribution to the fight for freedom turns out to be, are important primarily as emphatic examples of the political sentiments of the nations from which they come. Every man who braves the risks of political defection and escape from behind the Iron Curtain is, above all, a symbol. He is a symbol of the protest of his nation and its aspirations to freedom. The way in which individual refugees are received by the free world is a symbol of the sympathies of the democratic world toward enslaved nations, as well as an expression of the constant alertness and search on the part of this world for ways and means to assist the nations under Communist domination until the time of liberation comes. . . ."

Radio Free Europe, October 15, 1953

IN a dramatic move on September 18, Dr. Marek Korowicz, first alternate member of the Polish delegation to the United Nations asked for political asylum in the United States.

Announcing his decision at a press conference held by the National Committee for a Free Europe in New York, Dr. Korowicz declared: "I am overjoyed to be a free man in a free world. For the first time in seven years, I am now able to say what I truly think. I have left my post as a member of the Warsaw delegation in order to join the free Poles abroad and to work with them for the liberation of

my homeland and of all peoples oppressed by Soviet Communism."

Dr. Korowicz, a professor of international law at Cracow University, is a leading expert on Silesian problems and before the war represented Poland at the League of Nations and the International Court at the Hague. On September 1 of this year, he was directed by the dean of Cracow University to report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw. Minister Skrzyszewski informed him that he was to go to New York with the Polish delegation, stressing that this was the first time a non-Party man had been given such a post. Dr. Korowicz recognized that his opportunity to make a break for freedom was at hand.

After the delegates arrived in New York and moved into their official living quarters at the Chatham Hotel, Dr. Korowicz first registered his name at the United Nations so that the Communists could not later deny he had been a bona fide member of the Polish delegation. He then telephoned Stefan Korbonski, a former leader of the Polish Government-in-Exile and head of the Underground in Poland until his flight from the Communists in 1947. At 6.45 a.m. on September 16, Dr. Korowicz slipped out of the hotel to meet Korbonski, carrying the one suitcase he had brought from Poland and taking precautions against being seen by the other members of the delegation. His first act as a free man was to submit letters of resignation to the Chairman of the General Assembly and the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which he set forth his position:

"I have the honor of bringing to your attention that I formally renounce my membership in the Polish delegation to the Assembly of the United Nations.

"The members of the delegation headed by Naszkowski and Katz-Suchy do not in any way represent either the Polish nation or the people. It is thus impossible for me to work with these representatives not of my beloved country but of the Soviet regime in Poland."

In one of a rapid succession of broadcasts to Poland by Dr. Korowicz over Radio Free Europe, the professor outlined his personal plans for the future. "For the present," he said, "I will dedicate all my efforts to serving the Polish cause, to informing the free world of conditions in Poland through articles and lectures and through a book which I shall write on the subject. After I fulfill this first duty to my country, I would like to devote myself to scientific work in my own field, taking advantage of my freedom to write something more valuable than was possible under the restrictions in Poland."

The nature of his personal experience enabled Dr. Korowicz to give a first-hand account of the effects of Poland's seven years of Communist rule on university life. This effect is vitally important, since the free world recognizes Communist preoccupation with total domination over men's minds: a goal which puts a particularly high premium on educational control.

Marek Korowicz spent most of the war years working for Polish refugee groups in Southern France, after his release from a Nazi military prison in 1941. In 1944 he took over the Polish educational section of the French YMCA. In 1945 he was general secretary of the Polish Institute of Studies in Paris. He was recalled to Poland in 1946 by the Polish Institute of Sociological-Economic Studies in Katowice and by the Jagiellonian (Cracow) University. It did not take him long to find out that the promises made to the Polish nation by the regime installed by the occupying Red Army were not merely fantasy, but fraud.

Describing the experience of a professor in a present-day Polish university, Dr. Korowicz confirmed that there are strict precepts on tying doctrinal Marxism-Leninism to the content of all courses, particularly in the humanities, economics, sociology and law. For example, when



teaching international law, one must show at frequent intervals how "Anglo-American imperialism, striving to start a third World War, repeatedly violates the rules of international law."

Party control on professors is exercised chiefly through their assistants (who hold a position roughly equivalent to the British reader or American instructor), and through certain students charged with this task. In the faculty of the law department at Cracow there were only two members of the Communist Party, both assistants, while the remaining 22 were non-Party men. There is only one Party member respectively in the faculties of the Wroclaw and Poznan universities. Non-Party professors consider it a duty to stay at their posts, where they may at least teach some of the objective facts of their subject. The regime permits them to remain in the university, probably because it fears the adverse propaganda abroad which would result if they were dismissed. But in every Polish university there are several professors who are paid salaries but are not permitted to lecture.

The significance of the Party membership of the junior instructors lies, of course, in the fact that they are the professors of the future. But Korowicz recalled an incident which he felt was indicative of their role in the Party. Last July a large congress of jurists was held in Warsaw. Korowicz was seated next to one of the instructors, a Party member. A young lady was delivering a speech. The instructor leaned over and whispered deprecatingly, "She must be a Communist." "Aren't you too?" Korowicz said casually. The instructor replied, "You must know, professor, that 90 percent of the members of the Party are not Communist."

To His Students . . .

Professor Korowicz was recently given his first opportunity to strike a blow at the Communists' grip on the universities. Shortly after his defection from the Polish U.N. delegation, he received a letter from his students at the University of Cracow who had learned the news from the Western radio. The students congratulated their former professor on his step, and asked him to acknowledge their letter by radio. In his reply, broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe, he gave specific pointers to his students on how to circumvent the artificial barriers to learning erected by the Communist regime. Excerpts from this broadcast are quoted below:

"My dear students of the Jagiellonian University (Cracow) and the Marie Curie Sklodowska University (Lublin): I have received a letter dated September 19 from the students of the Jagiellonian (Cracow) University. It says in part: "On receiving this letter, please inform us over the radio."

"This is to inform you with the deepest emotion that I have received the letter. You cannot imagine the great happiness brought to me by this letter, and the amount of good it has done for me. You request that I spread the truth about the conditions of your life, of science and teaching at the universities in Poland. I solemnly promise you that I will fulfill your request, wherever I am able to, by spoken and written word. For the main motive of my escape was to serve Poland.

"Lectures at the universities in Poland often are torture both for the professor and the students. In the greater majority of cases the professors say not what they believe, but what is imposed on them from above. They spread the completely false doctrine of Marxism. Therefore, you must listen to those lectures critically. Many professors try to give you elements of objective science, but they are constantly forced to distort their own thoughts and their own words by giving examples from Marxism and Leninism as interpreted by Soviet politicians or scientists.

"What can be done to save the situation?

"First of all, you must use your own judgment. When you read articles—for instance, articles on matters pertaining to the law in the only two publications in Poland dealing with law—and when you find there writings of professors whom you esteem, you must understand that such articles were written on orders from above, that it is impos-

sible to refuse such an order, because one would be expelled from the faculty and deprived of work.

"You must also understand that the editors of the publications not only introduce changes into those articles, but shorten them and sometimes add as much as was originally written by the author. I can vouch for this because it has happened to me. Therefore, you must read the articles and the statements of your professors critically. Often, when you look straight into their eyes, you will see in those eyes a gleam of hesitation, of warning. You must understand what that means.

"All publications of the past five years in the field of humanities, especially in the realm of social sciences and law, are filled with notions which completely distort the scientific truth and the facts in various fields of public life, both at home and abroad. You must, therefore, seek other reading matter. Very few books come from abroad—as far as non-Marxist literature is concerned. You should try to get hold of pre-war publications. They still exist in the large libraries in Poland. In those publications you should read about the history of Poland, of world political and economic history, and the past literature of Poland.

"It is in those books that you will find the truth about the world which surrounds you, about your nation's past, its culture, its aims. It is clear to everybody, and most clear to you, that we are living through very difficult times. For a thousand years, Poland has gone through great tragedies, victories and defeats. Yet in the year 1800 there were only 9 million Poles in the world, and now there are 35 millions. The Polish nation does not perish, it grows.

"You, my beloved students, who were my dearest children—as I did not have any family in Poland—many of you felt and knew how close your education was to my heart. So listen to this advice I am now giving you. I hope that I will be in touch with you often over Radio Free Europe's "Voice of Free Poland." I beseech those who hear me to tell their friends about the contents of my talks. Later I will speak to my colleagues on the faculties of the universities where until recently I taught and lectured.

"Goodbye for the present—until you hear from me again very soon, my dear students."

"The Nature of Our Tragedy"

That Korowicz's range of experience was not confined to academic life in Poland was shown in his reply to a second letter which he received from a writer inside Poland. This letter had particular reference to the sufferings of Polish workers and peasants and asked that this be publicized in America. Professor Korowicz answered this letter too by broadcast to Poland over Radio Free Europe:

"My beloved countrymen, today I received another letter from Poland; this time not from my students, but, apparently, from an older person, who appraises the situation in Poland clearly and knows how to draw correct conclusions from it. I will quote parts of this letter. It begins:

"Dear Professor:

"Your decision to remain in the United States for

the purpose of denouncing Communist falsehoods about Poland has made a deep impression and caused widespread joy in this country. You are, Professor, yet another voice who has undertaken the great task of telling the free world of the Polish nation's suffering under Communist tyranny. The role of ambassador of a captive country is difficult and responsible, but it is also noble and gratifying, for you will be accompanied in your work by our heartfelt sympathy. We have followed as best we could all that you have said to American journalists and Congressmen; every Pole at home yearns for the opportunity to express himself on these matters. We wish that all Western countries, and especially the United States, fully understood the nature of our tragedy; we ask that nothing be omitted, no strong words spared, in describing our life in Poland.'

"My correspondent writes further:

"I don't know whether you, Professor, have ever been in direct contact with the workers' community or the Polish village, although I think that you must have been, for everything you have said is true'.

"I was in very close contact with the workers in Poland. Those of my friends who have known me for a long time can tell you that I spent some 24 years in Katowice, in Upper Silesia, a place very dear to my heart. For a number of years I lived outside Katowice in a sort of miners' colony. I saw them, the miners, every day—in streetcars, in buses, during walks. A number of miners' families were my nearest neighbors. I well know the situation of the workers, and especially of miners and foundry workers. I believe that in many ways the workers' situation is the worst of all. The Polish worker lives like a medieval serf, deprived of any personal freedom. Shockworkers are forced to set the pace for others, only to die themselves after two or three years. These men are exploited to the utmost, just as according to the Communists they were exploited by the 'capitalistic bloodsuckers.' I assure you, my dear friend and author of the letter, that I do think about the workers' problem, that I consider it a problem of prime importance.

"Similarly, the Polish peasants' condition is not unknown to me. My mother's family lived in the country for centuries, although I myself was born in Cracow. As a traveler who, several times a year, went on foot across the Polish

countryside through our Podhalian and sub-Cracovian villages, I became acquainted with the villagers' life. I know in what conditions the peasants and the medium farmers live, the latter harried and persecuted like hunting game. The Polish peasants are a huge unorganized force. Although they seem to be in a somewhat better position than the workers, they are very much affected by the grim reality of the all-encompassing State. Attention should be given to workers and peasants alike.

"But equal attention must be paid to the position of the Polish intelligentsia, to those who have created the Polish culture, and to all classes of Polish society. All of them suffer and all of them must be saved for the country, as it is put in my correspondent's letter. He writes that Poland is not only a giant prison, but that it is a prison in which the Poles are choking to death, that great losses will be suffered by the nation if salvation comes too late. He writes: 'You have said that 60 percent of the Polish people are without sufficient food. It should also be added that hundreds and thousands of Polish children have active tuberculosis, that a large percentage of them have rickets. Tuberculosis reaps its harvest not only among children, but among the adult population. Thousands die because they lack medicine and medical care. The poverty of the workers' families cannot be described. At present a Polish worker earns one-tenth of the wages of an American worker. The people are sinking into apathy, weariness, despair.'

"My correspondent concludes his letter: 'I think, sir, that in raising these questions I express the feelings of millions of Poles at home. It is important that you should bring these timely problems to the attention of your audiences in the United States. We all believe that your efforts will contribute much to America's understanding of our national tragedy. From the bottom of my heart, I wish you every success in your noble mission.'

"My dear unknown friend! Thank you sincerely for your letter. I know that you express the feelings of the nation; that you, and not our tyrants, represent millions of Poles. The things you say constitute the same truth which I have brought with me to the United States from Poland. Such is the truth which I will voice as long as I can and as well as circumstances permit. Such is the truth which I shall tell the world as long as my strength shall last."

Captive Audience

The Communist regime seeks to exploit to the maximum the "educational" or propaganda uses of television recently introduced in Czechoslovakia. Party house-wardens in apartment houses have been instructed to organize so-called "thrift circles," or tenants' pools, for the purchase of a communal television set. The set will be installed in the apartment of the house-warden, who will schedule the hours for the tenants to see the shows (as of May 1953, television programs were being broadcast three times a week.) Attendance at the programs will be obligatory. The house-warden must also conduct discussions with the tenants after the programs.

The Iron Tower

"Literature must become Party. . . . It cannot be generally an individual cause, independent of the proletarian cause as a whole. . . . The literary cause must become part of the general proletarian cause. . . ."

Lenin

BEFORE attempting to generalize about the kind of literature being produced in Communist-dominated Eastern Europe, it might be well to define our own standards and practices: What kinds of subject matter do American writers treat? What does the American public buy? What factors determine sales? Most important of all in contrasting another body of literature with our own, what basic artistic assumptions do all of us—writers, critics and general readers—make: not only in America, but throughout the Western world?

The answers to most of these questions are common knowledge to anyone who reads the book review section of any large Sunday newspaper. Without exaggeration it can be said that Americans are offered a wide variety of subject matter: among others, swashbucklers, whodunits, westerns, suspense novels, science-fiction, novels of manners, regional novels, fictionalized biographies, gentle-sentimentals, fantasy, crusading novels, historical novels, satires, humor, family chronicles. These, or combinations drawn from them, make up the vast majority of works which are evaluated for us in reviews and promoted through advertisements, radio plugs, displays, lectures, book clubs—all the topheavy paraphernalia of huckstering. How many copies a given novel sells is determined by the momentary whims or fads of the public; by the relatively stable direction of popular taste (formed not in a week or a year but over a generation and more); and by whatever impact the agencies of criticism and advertising may have been able to make either on the public's short-term whims or on its long-term tastes. In other words, sales volume results from a combination of interacting causes, all ultimately rooted in the preferences of the buying public.

The diversity of subject matter which this public supports can be broken down into roughly three categories: novels whose primary purpose it is to plead a cause, to make a case; those whose principle objective is to divert,

to provide an escape (be it through humor, horror, nostalgia or fascination) from the workaday world; and a third group called "serious" or "quality" novels, which may incidentally both plead and divert but whose basic intention is quite something else.

To define this something else is of prime importance, for it is precisely on this level of basic artistic assumptions that the Communists choose to do battle with the West and upon which they conduct their dialectical maneuvers. Faulkner, in his Nobel Prize speech, called it the business of novelists to portray the human heart in conflict with itself. Willa Cather, attempting to articulate quality, wrote: "Whatever is felt upon the page without being specifically named there—that, it seems to me, is created." "The house of fiction," Henry James said, "has . . . not one window, but a million, every one of which has been pierced, or is still piercable in its vast front, by the need of the individual vision and by the presence of the individual will." Almost anyone who has ever faced this question of the "something else" in great literature has worked out a different answer, reflecting his or her own personality and creative equipment. Nevertheless, under this multiplicity and independence of Western views lies a denominator common to all of them—a body of postulates about which all are in fundamental agreement.

Western Assumptions

Put crudely and no doubt superficially, the postulates are these:

(1) That the broadest function of literature (and all art) is to bring order to chaos: by a process of selection, to give artistic form to the ceaseless flow of data which make up the world of real experience;

(2) That any given writer's selection is uniquely his own: the form which he chooses to give it is an expression of his whole personality (including, among many other factors, his conscious philosophy), modified by the

demands of his medium (short story, novel, novella);

(3) That the success of his effort is never either "right" or "wrong," "correct" or "incorrect" in a provable sense: rather it is always either adequate or inadequate in artistic terms, in terms of dramatic vitality rather than of didactic content (though the two may reinforce one another and indeed always do in the great works of fiction);

(4) That the realm of all art, then (including literature, in spite of the fact that this medium happens to employ words) is the realm of the literally *unspeakable*. That is to say, the primary function of a novel is to communicate, by a series of juxtaposed symbols, human concepts and emotions which cannot precisely be communicated in any other way. Furthermore, this juxtaposition is irreducible: it is no more possible to state, in any but its own words, what "The Red Badge of Courage" conveys than it is possible to convey a Beethoven quartet by describing it.*

(5) This truism is not an "ivory tower," "art for art's sake" concept. All great literature, intentionally or not, does influence man's behavior; whether he will or no, every writer pleads for acceptance of his own view of life. The important point is this: that on the one hand an unlimited variety of philosophies may be found in great literature; and on the other hand no philosophy can help a novel which does not already have those artistic ingredients of greatness which we can only refer to (because dealing as they do with the unspeakable, they themselves are ultimately indefinable) in ambiguous terms such as "life," or "impact," or "power," or "depth," or "universal truth."

Communist Principles

The Communists disagree with these Western assumptions in almost every particular. While admitting that, in some broad sense, it is the business of the writer to give form to the formless, they deny that any given writer's

* This is what Bergson meant when he said "all art aspires to the condition of music."

form derives its essential value from being uniquely a product of his individual personality. Certainly, they say, no two human beings are alike, but the mainsprings of all human behavior are entirely the product of environment,



Polish Book Jackets

which in turn is economically determined. Politics is the institution through which we control the social structure which has been built upon the economic base. Instead of being only one of many factors in the entire personality complex which, according to the West, produces art, Communists maintain that art has a primarily politico-economic motivation. What a man writes, like all his other actions, is just one manifestation of where he stands politically. Consciously or not, every writer is either for or against following the inevitable path which Marx originally mapped out and down which Lenin, Stalin, and now Malenkov have guided all enlightened peoples. The rightness of this path is incontrovertible—as scientific as, say, the law of gravity. No matter what men obstruct the way or how, there is no other path to take. Therefore, those who obstruct are anti-mankind, and criminals. It follows from this reasoning that the success of any given literary effort is either correct or incorrect, right or wrong, in precisely the provable sense. Each is capable of being submitted to the same test; every word and implication of each is relevant data in testing whether or not the whole work speeds or retards the advent of worldwide Communism. The verdict pronounced on it is the only true measure of its value.

Certainly, they say, the novel like any other form of mass communication has its own techniques—ways of expression which other media can't duplicate. In this sense, a novel may be irreducible. The important thing, however, is not its nature but how effectively this nature has been exploited by any given novelist in his attempt to reshape men's values and responses to the Communist ideal.

Writer-Control

In the countries which they dominate, the Communists have taken a number of practical steps to control literary output, convert it to their own values and use it as a political force. Through writers' associations and conferences, the State Ministry of Art and Culture dictates subject matter: ruling out all counterparts of Western escape literature as "decadent"; all but a single specie of crusading novel as treasonous. Sales are seldom determined directly or indirectly by public taste—again it is the Minister of Culture (or perhaps the Minister of Propaganda) who decides how many copies of a given work will be printed, how they will be displayed, how priced, and what pressures will be brought on the public to buy. The only possible exception to this is the writer who is a national hero and symbol of past national greatness (Sienkiewicz in Poland, Jirasek in Czechoslovakia); and even with these men, their "following" must be usable to the Party or else their works are gradually liquidated. Criticism, as in the West, is a taste-forming agency, but the critic is no free-lance peddling his personal literary values: he is a mouth-piece for the State, required simultaneously to shape public preference to Party taste and to tip off writers as to the latest zigs and zags in the Party's literary line. It is because of the very stringency and narrowness of their self-imposed artistic limitations that Communist literature can

be discussed, and discussed with reasonable accuracy, in terms of broad judgments and sweeping generalities.

The Communist forced-conversion of Central European literature can be broken down into roughly two stages: the periods of "critical realism," and of "Socialist realism" supplemented by "revolutionary romanticism." Critical realism was permitted right after World War II (when the Communists first moved in on the Satellites), continued through their *coups d'état*, and ended roughly with their complete consolidation of power by the beginning of 1950. Under this literary line, the writer was required to declare himself on the side of Communism, to criticize the "bourgeois" characteristics of reality about him. Unlike exponents of Western realism, he was not allowed simply to describe or record: he had to take a stand; but he was not required to transform "bourgeois" characteristics under direct Party leadership.

"Socialist-Realism"

Socialist-realism went one step farther. It required the artist to extract all the leading ideas from reality and to embody them in revolutionary symbols—that is, in a manner deliberately designed to transform reality in accordance with the rules laid down in Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-criticism" and his "Party Organization and Party Literature." According to socialist-realist principles, man is created on this earth for the purpose of constantly developing his most valuable gifts (from the Communist viewpoint) in an effort to achieve final Marxist victory over the forces of nature—his own nature as well as the external world. In Communist aesthetics, the true socialist-realist writer perceives and expresses every phenomenon of this unfolding in the process of its development. He is expected not only to expose and attack the "old, bourgeois" way of life, but to revere the new, "Socialist" way and the new "Socialist man"—thereby providing (theoretically) the spiritual nourishment necessary for fulfilling the State's economic, cultural and political plans.

"Revolutionary romanticism" as a movement has been contemporary with, and an elaboration upon, socialist-realism. Party ideologists take pains to point out qualitative distinctions between their own "positive" concept of romanticism and the Romantic movement of the 19th Century. The latter, they maintain, was negative: it contented itself with stating that suffering exists and with "dreaming" that it will some day come to an end. Revolutionary romanticism, on the other hand, supposedly not only proves that suffering can be ended but, by arming readers with faith in the future victory of Socialism, it provides the means to end it: it changes and uplifts man to higher forms of behavior, assuring him that he alone is the master of his fate.

Actually, novels of the revolutionary-romantic school are not very distinguishable from those written under socialist-realism. They are more stylized, perhaps; the choice of symbols is more poetic, more "literary"; the presentation is more visionary and mystical; but they are equally didactic and one-dimensional. Each kind of novelist was

responsible for teaching his readers to be confident, cheerful, steadfast, industrious, fearful of no difficulty, eager to meet and overcome obstacles. His novels are required to develop and "lift" the reader's tastes (i.e. his ideological level), enrich him and carry him forward. Above all, they must be optimistic. Their common target is nothing less than the entire population.

In attempting to do all this, the conscientious Communist writer inevitably resorted to a high standardization of plot, setting, tone, content and characterization. He dealt with some aspect or another of "Socialist building" (plan fulfillment, kolkhoz life, new workers' housing) or with some "Socialist" aspect of the past (worker demonstrations, "liberation" by the Russian army). On occasion, he presented a distorted version of life in a foreign country, as does a 1953 Polish novel entitled *Book of Many Jungles* by Stanislaw Brodzki, which deals with the "jungles" of Switzerland, Portugal, Egypt, Palestine, England, West Germany and Africa, where "the crocodiles are much less dangerous than the armed policemen . . ." (*Przegląd Kulturalny* [Warsaw], September 23, 1953).

"The new hero of life is brave and confident, with experience and knowledge," said a literary article in *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), September 9, 1952. "He is seen on constructions, in schools, in research laboratories and at his post on the Fatherland borders. Free and happy, he strives for knowledge. Until his death he is faithful to the Communist Party—leader and organizer of the struggle for the people's welfare, to the great Soviet Union—liberator and protector of our Fatherland, and to the deed of peace and Socialism."

While the "positive" hero is a Party secretary, a Stakhanovite, a visiting Soviet worker or professor, a poor peasant or woman "liberated" by Communism—or a pre-war Communist underground worker or an historic "progressive" personality—the villain is a "kulak," a "reactionary" priest, an imperialist "spy" or a "cosmopolitan." With the happy ending (difficulties are overcome, plans are fulfilled), the virtue of the positive hero has triumphed, and the villain is defeated—all because of the leading


"For us, the Party is . . . I will say it frankly . . . everything. The family, father, brother and sister. To whom should we turn in the hour of need [if not to the Party?] . . . The Party gives each one of us something different. He who feels alone finds there support, family and brotherhood. His comrades will never forsake him nor will he forsake them. To some it gives the chance to struggle for great cause, to others a chance to take part in the realization of . . . how to express it . . . the most courageous and magnificent plans. . . . The Party is the most powerful of all elements, capable of taming all others. And it is the element composed of men. This sounds like poetry to you perhaps, but . . . admit it yourself—the Party is like a great hand, like a tremendous lever that gives a chance to everybody—a scientist, a writer, an architect, and the simplest of workers . . ." (*The Straight Road* by Stanislaw Kowalewski, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1949).

role of the Party and Marxist-Leninist theory. In place of love interest ("Love is no substitute for the class struggle": *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, September, 1953; "Laughter is a means of fighting": *Literarni Noviny*, February 7, 1953), the social-realist writer fills in with statistics on plan fulfillment, Party slogans, and "new Socialist men." Style, as a result, is either journalistic or propagandistic. An example is shown above.

"Production" Novels

The socialist-realist novel which deals with contemporary life, and particularly with an aspect of its production, appears to be preferred by the Satellite Communist regimes over an historical or biographical novel written from the "Socialist" point of view. The "production" novel, in fact, is most receptive to the socialist-realist method. Its setting is generally a place of work (in a factory, on a farm, or at some construction project), and its protagonist is shown in his day-to-day efforts to settle the ideological conflicts of his fellow workers. The production novel describes the process of conversion: how a worker becomes a Stakhanovite through Party propaganda, how a peasant is convinced of the merits of collective farming, how the enemy is defeated in his attempts to "sabotage" production. One of the Hungarian regime's favorites (*The Beautiful Life*, by Ferenc Karinthy) deals with Stakhanovites. According to *Irodalmi Ujsag*, August 29, 1953, it "convincingly illustrates how the thinking of the simple man is being transformed in the new Hungary." Another Karinthy novel, *The Mason*, "describes how Communism is transforming the people."

Because it is devoid of human element (aptly illustrated in the accompanying cartoon), and is at best only a superficial, empty treatment of the problems it treats, the pro-



"For whom did you build such a strange apartment — without a bathroom, kitchen or bedroom?"

"A positive hero will live here!"

Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), January 11, 1953

duction novel* has already become outmoded in Poland, where it was in vogue from 1950 to 1952. Since the beginning of this year it has been frequently criticized—not for its theme, but for “artistic” failures. *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw) wrote on August 2, 1952: “Our young people avoid reading many of our literary works which—while they are politically correct and principally right—are dull, gray and devoid of humor and the spirit of adventure; so unlike their [youth’s] true, everyday life. . . . By using realistic media, we construct a fictitious world filled with false optimism. What our youth wants to find in books is the truth . . . that struggle, sweat and blood, those sacrifices and victories through which—as if up the steep stairs—we lift the nation. . . .”

Double Exposure

Communist ideologists had no intention of exchanging their own standards for Western postulates about the meaning of “artistic.” What the Polish critics now demanded of writers was not that they abandon the politico-economic concept of man or cease trying to portray the Communist ideal for their captive readers, but that they do just this and do it much more effectively: that they take what people actually feel, the way they actually behave, and bring that into closer focus with the Party’s image of what they ought to feel and how they ought to act. This was not in any sense a rejection of “socialist-realism” as such, but of the mishandling of one offshoot—the “production novel”—which had been mass produced in Poland almost to the exclusion of all other possible themes and treatments. What the Polish writers had done, in their pathetic efforts to please their masters, was stray so far from any recognizably human symbols that the Communist ideals themselves were in danger of appearing equally lifeless and one-dimensional. “The best we have been able to do,” admitted critic Henryk Bereza in *Tworczosc* (January, 1953), “is to make quasi-journalistic observation on the fragmentary sections of contemporary life. The synthesis of these observations was the so-called production novel, usually dealing with a specific work plant. . . . Demands were made from writers to produce separate novels about miners and fishermen, chemists and pharmacists, sugar plants and engine factories, candy factories and wineries, while it was forgotten that the theme of production does not in itself determine the artistic values of literature or literature’s connections with the present. The so-called production novel was at its best an achievement only insofar as it reflected the problems of the people’s life. . . . But it doesn’t follow, of course, that this type of novel expressed everything that literature can say about the building of Socialism, that this method of writing exhausted all possibilities which the social-realist writer has at his disposal. . . .”

* Some State prize winners in Poland, for example, are entitled *Campaign Means Struggle* by Miroslaw Kowalewski, *Tractors Will Conquer Spring* by Witold Zalewski, and *No. 16 Produces* by Jan Wilczek.

In effect, the Party wanted to have its artistic cake and eat it too: to confine man’s total aspirations and every facet of his personality to a single political and economic pattern, and still make the presentation of that pattern so subtle and complex that it would stand for all of life. There was not a thing wrong with the pattern itself, they insisted: the fault lay with the writers. “. . . The many-sided, seething life of Soviet society is depicted drearily and tediously in the works of some of our writers. . . .” Georgi Malenkov declared at the Soviet 19th Party Congress in October, 1952. “[They] must pillory the faults, shortcomings and unhealthy phenomena to be met with in society. They must create positive artistic images of the men and women of the new type, in all their splendor and human dignity, this being conducive to the fostering in our society of habits and customs free from the sores and vices bred by capitalism. . . . We need Soviet Gogols and Shchedrins who can burn out of life with the fire of their satire all that is negative, rotten, stagnant—all that retards our forward movement. Our Soviet literature . . . must bravely depict the contradictions and conflicts of life, must wield the weapon of criticism as part of the work of the Soviet writer. . . .”

The call for a marriage of ideology with art echoed throughout the Satellite area. “We must learn not to ‘arrange’ things,” critic Vaek Kania wrote in the Czechoslovak paper *Literarni Noviny*, September 12, 1953. “We must not dress them up. Whatever the truth may be, it should be told. . . . A writer must be left to express things as he sees them. . . . He should not be required, for instance, to write the story of a bad functionary with a happy ending if, in truth, the tale ended on an unhappy note.” The Romanian daily *Scanteia*, in an article directed to the Union of Romanian Writers, wrote on July 25, 1953:

“. . . Certain heroes appear lifeless, lacking in combativeness. . . . The worker must be presented—with his own characteristics—in the midst of his free and creative labors. It is true that literature must show production as well as the worker, his family, friends and society. But one must avoid the error of discussing the process of production too extensively to the detriment of man and of the thoughts that preoccupy him. . . .”

The Malenkov Muse

“The thoughts that preoccupy him”: it is exactly this phrase that needs clarification, for the Party critics did not mean that writers should actually present their own intuitive versions of those thoughts. Rather, they should dramatize the thoughts with which the Party would like to have man preoccupied—but do so in terms close enough to his actual thoughts to be credible and therefore artistically effective. Writing in the literary magazine *Csillag* (December, 1952), the Bolshevik author Otto Major discussed this point in some detail in an essay on “The Problem of Creating Types”:

"Our artists, our writers, and our art workers," said Malenkov, "in their work of creating artistic characters must constantly keep in mind that not only that which most frequently occurs is typical, but also that which most perfectly and most strikingly expresses the essence of a given social force. In the Marxist-Leninist sense, that which is typical is by no means equivalent to some statistical average. That which is typical expresses the essence of a given socialist historical phenomenon, and not simply something that is most widespread, the most frequent, or an everyday occurrence. The deliberate exaggeration and accentuation of a character does not exclude the possibility of its remaining typical; on the contrary, it more completely reveals and emphasizes the typical. In realistic art the typical is the basic sphere of the manifestation of party-mindedness [sic]. The problem of the typical is always a political problem...."

"The typical," says Malenkov, "is the basic sphere of the manifestation of party-mindedness in realistic art." This also means," Major amplified, "that the non-typical representation—whether it be called literary objectivity or 'historical accuracy'—is the manifestation of opposition to party-mindedness in the struggle for a realistic art. Thus it is true that the problem of the typical is in all places and at all times a political problem; thus the controversy over the creation of types is one battle in the struggle for party-minded literature; thus the parties opposing one another in this controversy are the bearers of class ideologies: the fighters for a party-minded literature on the one hand and on the other hand persons who knowingly or unknowingly are the representatives of the bourgeois ideology."

Novelists' Dilemma

Lack of artistry, sensitivity, subtlety, depth, vitality—whatever a given critic may call it—is at the base of any Party criticism of the contemporary Satellite novel. The writer may be accused of an insufficient grasp of Communist ideology, a lack of class consciousness, skepticism, or an absorption with personal, introspective concepts. He may be labelled an esthete or of being over-sensuous. He may be "guilty" of overemphasising style, indulging in "barren experimentation," or (as noted earlier) of devoting too little attention to "style." Inevitably, the various criticisms boil down to this: the writer's inability to make his art conform—sincerely and sensitively—with regime politics. Writers today are certainly aware of the political role of the artist in the new Socialist society, but virtually none is able to reconcile it with his own personal conception of art. An attack in *Nowa Kultura*, June 7, 1953, on a popular Polish writer, Adolf Rudnicki, is a good example of the difficulty in conforming to a single ideology and attitude:

"Rudnicki's indeterminate social and philosophical attitude has given birth to the thesis that suffering of any kind is one of the noblest themes of creation. This thesis, contained in the epilogue of *Major Hubert* and quite stubbornly used throughout Rudnicki's work, makes

fragments of life, instead of life as a whole, the subject matter of his writing. Rudnicki's error lies in equalizing the values of various social attitudes and resigning from the consequences of ideology for which he has substituted a vague literary humanism, an indiscriminate, equalitarian attitude towards all kinds of human suffering and attitudes...."

A critic writing in the Bulgarian monthly *Septemvri*, January, 1953, accuses author Krustu Belev of "moving along the line of least resistance." In his novel *The Girls From the Plant*, the critic wrote, "it is difficult to see the growing contradiction between masters and workers, between regime and people. The author has not... pointed out the complexity of political and economic development. He has failed to outline basically and concretely the contradictions in the bourgeois-fascist system...."

The problem of the artist who finds it difficult to relinquish his personal artistic values, despite his political awareness, is well summed up in a literary review in the Polish weekly *Nowa Kultura*, June 7, 1953, of a contemporary novel entitled *Ignas Lek*. "Lek is a writer of proletarian origin who betrayed his class," the critic wrote. "He sold himself to the bourgeoisie, became a favorite of the semi-fascist press. He was one of those 'who feel quite comfortable at the pedestal, where shrewdness guards the poverty of their works.' After the war and occupation, having observed all the great revolutionary changes, Lek understood the defeat of his life—both as a writer and a man. His social and political awareness prompted him to participate in the struggle, but his pen refused to serve as an instrument of creation:

"It seems to me that I understood everything too late. I have no more strength left in me. I sit over this piece of paper, feeling dry as pepper. Words lost their light."

"Ignas Lek," the critic continued, "is proof that all these misunderstandings which became such a burden in the writer's attitude to the artist's role have not ended. The tale, while realistically true, gives us as a solution the 'metaphysical concept' of fate; it avoids a clear solution.... The difficulties of transforming his writing workshop become here a conflict whose source lies not so much in his indeterminate social attitude, but more in the wilfulness of art itself...."

"We don't know why words lost their light for Ignas Lek," the critic concluded. "They should have, on the contrary, acquired more brightness. Once again... art refuses to obey the artist and has its own separate and unexplored rights."

The necessity to create by using ready-made Party formulas (e.g., the positive hero) is only one reason for failure. Regret and nostalgia appear to be obstacles even for the writer who shows full comprehension of his new and inevitable place in Communist society. Polish writer Wilhelm Mach expressed this attitude in *Nowa Kultura* (October 26, 1952) in an article referring to a pre-coup novel by a contemporary, Wojciech Zukrowski:

"When you published your first book, *From the Land of Silence*, I wrote enthusiastically. I reproached you, a

little, about your flirting . . . with the angles of metaphysics, but even in my reproach I appreciated the beauty of your sins. I praised you for your sensitive, humanistic imagination, for your loyalty to the dead and your love of the living. I praised you for your love of the earth, for your senses with which you so ably detected every possible color, sound and scent. I praised you for your exquisite art and for your great talent. I praised you from a position which was then nearest to me—a position of the humanist 'in general' and an esthete, sensitive to any quality of symmetry.

"That was six years ago. Since then a lot has changed around us and within us. . . ."

The writer's unwillingness—or inability—to adjust to a Socialistic concept of art is matched equally with the Party's own firm stand, frankly expressed by Hungary's Minister of People's Culture, Jozsef Revai:

" . . . The writer attempts to defend his 'right to write about those things he wishes.' In our world, however, the writer has no such 'right' . . . We cannot recognize the esthetic maxim that the 'taste and judgment' of the writer is the chief criterion of what and how to write. The taste and judgment of the writer cannot be contrary to the judgment and interests of the people, the State, the Party. It is not the people and the State which should adapt themselves to the taste and judgment of the writer, but the writer must become *one* with the interests of the building of Socialism by his work and learning."

(Tarsadalmi Szemle [Budapest], September 14, 1952.)

Submission and Rebellion

Captive writers, then, continue in their attempts to satisfy political requirements, and while most "produce" enough works, and a few achieve temporary official acclaim (it is not uncommon for the regime to withdraw State prizes it granted a month or even a year ago), almost none are successful either from their own or the Party's point of view. Only a few have been convinced that their former literary production was merely a bourgeois illusion and that true art is as prescribed by the Party.

Many writers, particularly the older ones, do little creative work, taking the path of least resistance in translations, articles or literary criticism. Others have publicly confessed their sins but are still silent, unable to "make their pens obey." A final group writes regularly, but also expresses its hostility, in varied ways: by writing of the "progressive" past and ignoring contemporary life; by creating individualistic characters instead of the stereotyped positive Party version; by being concerned only with style, giving content minor consideration (and vice versa); or (rarely) in open revolt, by actually writing in the "world of the unpermissible"—about love, for example. Some, complying with all requirements, put out such a poor product that it becomes a parody on Communist life and indirectly takes the form of "resistance." Writers also rebel under the guise of "criticism and self-criticism," as Hungarian author Peter Veres has done in his "production"

novelette *The Apple Orchard*, published in *Csillag*, June, 1953:

"Weeks and months have passed since the establishment of the Winter Apple Growing Enterprise, and nothing has happened yet; we still have not finished the organization of the main office, let alone the organization of the different orchards throughout the country. . . . We could not reach the point at which we could submit an acceptable plan of our future work, the organization of the enterprise, the personnel and the budget to the Ministry and to the Planning Bureau. . . .

"We are mainly concerned with the fight between Kemeny and Horn, the directors of the enterprise. In the meantime, thin and poor people, who remained here from the old feudal world, wait all over the country for the better, happier world we once promised and are continuing to promise them. . . .

"The principal argument is over the filling of the most important positions and executive jobs, and that was the reason that we did not have time or energy to do really important work. . . .

"While this is going on, the enterprise will not be established; only money is spent and the losses increase. Political shame grows in the same proportion, since we took away the orchards from the cooperatives, the individual farmers and, in many places, even from those who had received it in the land reform. We promised to make those orchards flourish and they are worse than ever. The reason: we have no plans ready for serious work and so we do not have money and credit. . . ."

Another novel, by Albanian author Turhan Shilegu, expressed open criticism by pointing out in his 1952 book entitled *Stakhanovite* that workers at his fictitious plant were afraid of the regime. The hero, Petraq, is arrested and brought to trial for breaking his machine while attempting to apply Soviet work methods. In the end, two saboteurs are discovered and the blame is correctly placed on them; Petraq is freed, and according to a critic writing in the Party daily *Zeri i Popullit* for December 24, 1952, the novel should "realistically" have closed at this point. Author Shilegu, wrote the critic, is "ignorant of the realities in the country, of the true situation of the working class," when he writes that at a later meeting of the workers, the people "were seized by great anxiety." When they saw the Party secretary, he wrote, "they became jittery, looked furiously, and their eyes were fixed on each other's."

The "Correct" Approach

Convinced of the rationality of a merger of politics with art (despite writers' expressions to the contrary) the Party urges literary men to acquire the same "correct" approach to life, recommending the following methods: writers should study Marxism-Leninism; they should engage in criticism and self-criticism; they should live and work with the proletariat in order to understand the new social structure, absorb the proper background, and give a true picture of the life and struggle of the working class; and they should contribute newspaper articles in order to get the feel of the times. "Writers are called engineers of souls," *Lidove Noviny* (Prague) wrote on August 29, 1953.



rys. Karol Baraniecki

— Mówi, że tak lepiej pisze mu się powieść z życia nowej wsi...

He says that in order to write his new novel about village life he has to put himself in this atmosphere. . . .

Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), June 14, 1953

"They are, however, also the doctors of human hearts. And what kind of doctor would he be who made a diagnosis without knowing the patient? Working with our newspapers will eventually make us intimately familiar with the time, will reveal a multitude of themes for the writer, a complexity of human characters and real-life conflicts. . . ."

These ideological-cleansing methods (largely matters of individual responsibility) are supplemented by Party-arranged writers' conferences at which authors are criticized and encouraged, usually "in the light of" Zhdanov's or Malenkov's theories on art, and invariably "in a spirit of criticism and self-criticism." Often the writer's conference is a tool by which the Party imposes desired revisions in completed works. Under the pressure of "discussions" and "recommendations" by members of the writer's union, authors are obliged to acknowledge their errors, which are made public in the press, and, usually, to submit to a re-write of entire chapters or portions. Such an attack on one writer serves as a veiled warning to all others, keeping them in a constant state of uneasiness and doubt. In expressing this feeling in the November 23, 1952 issue of *Nowa Kul-*

tura, Jerzy Andrzejewski, one of Poland's talented prewar writers, seems to be speaking for all the authors—and all their readers—throughout the captive area. Andrzejewski shows both the sadness and the hope characteristic of imprisonment. In an attitude of self-accusation, he writes:

"I do not think that our young Socialist literature makes full use of its humanistic duties and that, while shaping the new man, it accompanies, faithfully and wisely, millions of our countrymen in their 'nights and days' of our times. Do the working people—the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia—find a true reflection of their lives in our contemporary literature? A true picture of their daily victories and defeats, their enthusiasm and doubts, joy and depression, doesn't quite come through. . . ."

"Do we listen carefully enough to the thoughts and emotions of our readers? Do we respect them as they should be respected—these people who live and work in these exceptionally violent and difficult times; these people who do not desert the battlefield but, on the contrary, take the nation's fate firmly into their hands? . . . Do they respect and love us—these readers for whom we write and create?"

If there are answers to Andrzejewski's questions, they do not lie in the realm of politically directed criticism, in whether a work is "correct" or "incorrect." Neither the novel, nor any art form, can be manipulated to express an imposed view of life or to defend on order a political point of view. The Communists begin with an erroneous set of assumptions about art, and when the results built on these assumptions are perceived, even they remain dissatisfied. There is a different set of basic assumptions, those which grant each writer the freedom to regard that which he wants to express and his method of expressing it as valuable in and of itself, a highly personal vision of life, never quite definable in any terms other than those he has chosen himself, or which have been imposed on him from within by the demands of his intellect and temperament. Throughout East Europe, the Communists have tried to lead and force their novelists into the iron tower of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy on the pretext that this was the only alternative to the "ivory tower" decadence of Western literature, but what still remains between the iron tower and the ivory tower is the house of fiction with its wide and numberless rooms.

The First Oppressor

"Logically . . . it evolves that [Christopher] Columbus was not only the discoverer of the new continent, but also the first of a long series of oppressors and exploiters of the indigenous population of the New World, which he discovered."

Literarni Noviny (Prague), October 3, 1953

Fashion ~

ON September 17 Czechoslovakia was host to the first international fashion show held behind the Iron Curtain. Only four Soviet-bloc countries were represented (Russia, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia), with delegates from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria sitting in as "observers." After a spectacular entrance amid fanfare and applause by Czechoslovak president Antonin Zapotocky and his cabinet, Prime Minister Siroky, Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov and the entire diplomatic corps, Czech Light Industry Minister Malek took the rostrum in Prague's Exhibition Palace to explain the serious purpose of the show:

"The competing nations are not going to close their doors to each other; there will be none of the fashion spying here that we hear so much about in Paris and abroad. Each nation is going to put into production the best patterns that are chosen here, so that the people of all these countries will be able to buy them. . . . We aim at creating fashions independent of capitalist taste. Capitalist fashions are eccentric, flashy and alien to our tastes. We want to clothe our workers economically, practically and comfortably. . . ." (Radio Prague, September 21, 1953)

Styles were judged according to strict technical standards, including the amount of material required, amount of waste, and quality of workmanship. First prize went to the Soviet Union, as conforming most strictly to contest requirements; the second place went to Hungary and the third to Czechoslovakia. The judges admitted, however, that the Czechoslovak collection had won first prize "from

the point of view of beauty," for its good lines, variety and use of beautiful materials.

The Soviet collection was characterized by rich use of embroidery, in imitation of the peasant costume. It "illustrated folk tradition applied to present needs." Hungarian designers were applauded for their use of tastefully chosen hats, handbags and shoes, thus giving a picture of "perfect harmony."

Esti Budapest admitted, however, in its October 16 issue, that there were a few "errors": "One navy blue dress with a white inset, for example, is already being manufactured by the Debrecen Clothing Factory and is available in the shops."

Some of the 48 designs shown, ranging from practical work clothes to strapless evening gowns, are reproduced on these pages. Contrasted with the photograph above of three Estonian women, they strikingly illustrate the wide gap existing between the fashion world and the world of the average Satellite woman. From left to right in each photograph, the models represent the USSR, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.



Wear or When?

"We can't think where or when we should ever be able to wear these pretty dresses. . . . Even when we do go to the theater we never wear 'evening' or 'reception' dresses. . . . We would never dream of appearing so overdressed."

—Letter to the Fashion Editor of *Esti Budapest*, September 25, 1953



The Communist emphasis upon physical culture is shown in these gym clothes designed especially for the show. No "play clothes" were displayed.



The "liberated" Satellite woman spends the greater part of her day "on the job." The models here show suitable clothing for factory and farm.



In standard Satellite practice, Czechoslovakia and East Germany "followed the Soviet model." Only Hungary (second from left) showed any originality in designing winter coats.



The greatest variety was seen in designs for evening, where the rule on saving material appears to have been violated considerably. The USSR model is even sporting a luxurious fur wrap.

The "New Course"

JUST what do the Communists really mean in their series of concessions, promises of concessions and simultaneous tightening of controls? Are they confused or merely contradictory? Is this caprice or is there method in their madness? An enormous amount of evidence indicates that the Communists throughout the Soviet bloc (and in the Soviet Union itself) are continuing to play both sides of the street. They talk of improving the "material and cultural welfare of the masses" and expanding consumer goods industries, but continue their heavy industrialization. They promise release of peasants from the collective farms and then make it difficult or impossible for the farmers to leave. They call for "voluntary" collectivization and increased "solidarity" and more intensive Party work on kolkhozes. They talk about encouraging small and middle independent farmers, then denounce "kulaks" and give preferential treatment on taxes, delivery quotas, equipment and fertilizers to the kolkhozes. They reduce prices and raise money wages, but maintain calculated commodity shortages, and increase productivity norms and quotas while reducing real wages or continuing them at the same low level.

Everywhere in the Soviet orbit, the right hand gives and the left takes, one side of the mouth speaks softly and conciliatingly, and out of the other side comes the gravel-throated authoritarian voice of Communism: *davai!* Get going!

The way best calculated to tell not what the Communists are *saying*, both for internal and foreign consumption, but what they are *doing*, is to analyze what funds they are allocating to their various schemes. Since almost all the countries of the Soviet bloc treat investment and economic information as secretly as they do military information, and since there are State Secret laws under which such "revelations" are punished, figures are at best open to interpretation and at worst not available at all. However, in the interest of clarifying present Communist policy, the following attempts some analysis of present investment policy and practice behind the Iron Curtain.

Theoretical Doubletalk

The key to the "new economic policy" is contained in Premier Malenkov's August 8 speech. Perhaps the entire program is summed up in three points: continued stress on heavy industry, increased consumer goods industry, and increased agriculture to supply food and raw materials:

"... we must always remember that heavy industry constitutes the basis of the foundations of our Socialist economy because without the development of heavy industry it is impossible to insure further development of light industry, increased productivity of agriculture, and the strengthening of the defensive power of our country."

The emphasis and order in which Malenkov puts these various factors indicates clearly that the Communists still consider heavy industrialization their main goal. A September 17 editorial in *Rude Pravo* (Prague) also maintains the old heavy industrialization emphasis and shows little policy reorientation. It admits a disproportionate development of industrial and agricultural production, but also declares:

"Heavy industries are [still] to be given priority in the development of the national economy. . . . The general line of the Party has turned out to be correct. The development of heavy industry and its nucleus, machine tools, enabled us to lay the foundations of Socialist development. . . . Heavy industries serve as the basis for mechanization of agriculture, which in its turn is an essential prerequisite for Socialization of the countryside. Without heavy industry, we would be unable to raise the standards of living so rapidly. . . . Thanks to the heavy industries we have been able to set up a strong defense for our country."

The editorial ends by saying that the rate of expansion of heavy industry would be reduced to allow the production of raw materials and fuel resources to catch up, and, lastly, to allow consumption to increase. It is noteworthy that

increased consumption was the last consideration. The editorial continued with the clear statement:

"We shall, of course, continue our policy of Socialist industrialization, which is the only correct policy and which is based on heavy industrial development. As for the countryside, we shall continue to develop the farming cooperatives."

HUNGARY

In the past four months, the Kremlin has used the Hungarian situation as a kind of trial run. In his July 4 speech, Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy publically kicked off the "new economic policy" by admitting that the country had overextended itself in the field of industrialization.

"... the exaggerated rate of industrialization and especially of the too-rapid tempo of the development of heavy industry and large-scale investments, has resulted in very little being provided from the country's material resources for the development of agriculture. . . . The government regards it as one of its foremost duties to increase substantially the sum for agricultural investments by simultaneously cutting industrial investments to insure a speedy and large-scale increase in agricultural output. . . . At the same time one of the basic principles of the government's economic policy will be the constant raising of the working people's living standards."

This was a far cry from former Premier Rakosi's reputed statement to Eugen Varga, Soviet-Hungarian economist, that the Hungarians would eat up the future of Hungary if they continued to eat so much.

An examination of past Hungarian investment plans gives some indication of how the program has evolved. In the Hungarian Three Year Plan (1947-1949), investments of 10.3 billion *forints* were divided as follows: 32 percent to industry and mining, 27 percent to transport and communications, 22 percent to building and public service, and only 9 percent to agriculture. The Five Year Plan, as originally set forth in 1949, provided for an investment of 50.9 billion *forints* (\$4.3 billion). Of this sum, 41 percent was to be devoted to industry, 14 percent to transport and communications, 5 percent to housing and social and cultural purposes, and 25 percent to agriculture. The Plan, if fulfilled, provided that the place of industry in national income was to increase from 49.7 percent in 1949 to 58.7 percent in 1954.

A revision of the Plan was ordered in 1950 to speed up the tempo of industrial development and included investments of 85 billion *forints* and a 5 billion *forint* reserve fund. The following table compares the proposed objectives under the original Plan with those in the revised Plan.*

	Original Plan	Revised Plan
Heavy Industry	204	380
Light Industry	173	245
Total Industry	186	310

* Production index of 1948 equals 100.

The results of this program were such that on July 11 Rakosi was forced to admit in a speech over Radio Kosuth:

"... we have to note that in the zeal of creative work we have committed serious errors. First, we imposed an excessively rapid pace on our heavy industrial development and on capital goods production. . . . We committed the gravest error of all in February 1951 when we fixed our industrial targets too high in the Five Year Plan . . . we increased the investment figure of 50 billion *forints* to 80 billion . . . [which] was far too much. . . . According to the plan, living standards were to rise by 50 percent [but] . . . since the beginning, errors crept into our revised plan which, in advance, made such an increase impossible.

"In fact, the augmented Five Year Plan envisaged ten times as much investment for heavy and machine industries as for light and food industries. Also the amount envisaged for agricultural investments was similarly insufficient. It was precisely the production of . . . light, food and agricultural industries which could have largely increased and secured a higher standard of living. . . . One of the main objectives in the revision of our plans will be to effect much larger investments in agriculture than in the past."

The following table compares fiscal allocations for the original Five Year Plan with those of the revised Plan.

Distribution of Investment Outlay*
(total investment = 100)

	Original Plan	Revised Plan
Agriculture and Forestry	15.7	12.9
Heavy Industry	35.9	47.6
Light Industry	5.9	4.1
Transport and Communications	14.8	11.8
Internal Trade	1.7	1.2
Housing and Communal Buildings	10.0	7.6
Cultural and Social Investments	4.5	3.0
Miscellaneous	**11.5	**11.8

It is important to note that in the revised Plan, agriculture, light industry, housing and social and cultural investments were neglected.

The Plan's progress may be followed in detail by an examination of the annual investment allocations and reports. Zoltas Vas, former President of the Hungarian Planning Bureau, reported in his study *Tasks of the Second Year of the Five Year Plan* that the amount invested during the Plan's first year (1950) was 9.5 billion *forints*. He also stated that 172.6 billion *forints* would be invested in 1951. However, the actual amount invested that year was only 11.7 billion *forints*, according to Deputy Minister of Finance Istvan Antos, as quoted in *Nepszava* (Budapest), December 18, 1951. Antos also stated that 15.8 billion

* Source is *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1953.

** This includes reserves for projects as yet unforeseen.

forints would be appropriated for investments in 1952. This sum was slightly raised subsequently so that the final figure appropriated during 1952 was 15.5 billion *forints*. In the December 17, 1952 *Nepszava*, Finance Minister Olt estimated that investment appropriations for 1953 would amount to 19 billion *forints*.

The aggregate amount, either appropriated or spent in the annual Plans from 1950 through 1953 equals 55.7 billion *forints*. Even if the sum appropriated for 1954 were 23 billion *forints* (based approximately on the previous rate of increase), and this is not likely since the regime anticipates a scaling down of investments, an overall investment figure for the Five Year Plan would be approximately 78.7 billion *forints*, a figure which falls somewhere between the original Plan and the revised Plan. This is further substantiated by the percentage of investment allotted to heavy industry in 1952: 40 percent. Although this figure is above the original Plan estimate of 35.9 percent, it is considerably below the revised Plan of 47.6 percent.

Emphasis on heavy industrial investment has not been as great, therefore, as the revised Plan called for. The report of the Central Office for Statistics on Plan fulfillment for the third quarter of 1953 gives additional support to this premise. It states that industry has fulfilled the "modified" Plan by 102.5 percent during the third quarter, which might mean that a new "modified" Plan has been substituted for both original and revised Plans.

Changes in Emphasis

Recent developments in Hungarian investment policy indicate that minor changes of emphasis are taking place. The following are in evidence:

(a) Work on the Budapest subway project, one of the largest construction projects under the 1953 Plan, has been slowed down considerably. The surplus manpower is being transferred to the mining industry which is short of workers. An estimated 2 billion *forints* had been spent on the project up to this spring and by slowing down the work, the government will probably save two to three hundred million *forints* on this year's budgetary expenditures.

(b) Construction work on the Lenin Smelting Works at Diosgyor has also been slowed down. The deadline for completing reconstruction of the steel works has been extended indefinitely. One of the principal reasons for the slowdown is the acute shortage of basic materials, machines and spare parts. Production at the Matyas Rakosi Works has also been cut back.

(c) Construction on the Nagytetyen-Diosd railroad station has been discontinued. Most of the workers have been transferred to the new steel plant, Sztalinvaros.

It is estimated that planned cutbacks in heavy industrial investment will amount to no more than five percent of the gross amount (19 billion *forints*) originally appropriated for investment under the 1953 budget. Great efforts have been made to propagandize an investment increase of 55 percent in food production which would



"Now I don't understand it all:—we agreed with the decision of the government, we sent congratulatory and greeting telegrams, when we were criticized, we fully admitted our errors—and now to top it all they even want us to fulfill the plan."

Květy (Prague), May 28, 1953

amount to several hundred million *forints*. Among the new projects contemplated are new bread factories, dairies, and expansion and improvement of the sugar, paprika, vegetable oil and confectionary industries.

New investments in light industry are of less significance than those for the food industry. Among the additional investment projects contemplated are a 20 to 30 percent increase in the production of the Szigetvar Shoe Factory and improvement of production facilities in both furniture and textile industries. In the building industry, the regime has promised construction of 40,000 new apartments for next year.

In farming, current information indicates that the production of fertilizer and agricultural machinery is being accelerated. The construction of the Hortobagy (Eastern) Canal, a portion of which was built before World War II, has been speeded up. The canal, through its large scale irrigation facilities, will be considerable aid to agriculture.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The standard of living in Czechoslovakia has declined more in recent years than in any other Satellite country. Because of heavy concentration on capital goods production, consumer goods industries were neglected, food production was relegated to second importance, and many export industries (such as the dollar-earning crystal and chinaware industries) were entirely scrapped. This stress on heavy industry was based both on Communist theory and on stepped-up Soviet demands for Czechoslovak heavy industrial products. Czechoslovakia received little in return for the sacrifice of her Western markets and her exports to the East. This adverse situation can be examined in the

relationship between the original Five Year Plan and the accelerated Plan forced on Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1951.*

	Original Plan	Revised Plan
Heavy Industry	170	230
Light Industry	150	170
Total Industry	157	198

The original Czechoslovak Plan provided for investments of 336.2 billion *koruny*, while the revised plan allowed for a 66 percent increase. Since the original Plan had all but neglected consumer goods industries and agriculture, it may readily be seen that the stepped-up Plan further aggravated an already serious situation.

The following investments were provided for in the initial Five Year Plan (scheduled to run from 1949 through 1953).

Distribution of Investment Outlay**

(billion *koruny* in 1948 prices)

Sector	Equip- ment	Construc- tion	Total	% of Total
Industry	87.3	44.6	131.9	39.2
Agriculture	15.0	11.8	26.8	8.0
Building Industry	3.9	.7	4.6	1.4
Transport	29.8	23.1	52.9	15.7
Trade (incl. tourist) ...	3.1	1.9	5.0	1.5
Housing	—	39.3	39.3	11.7
Social, Health, and Cultural Services	14.2	14.4	28.6	8.5
Public Administration (roads, bridges, dams, etc.)	6.0	41.1	47.1	14.0
Total	159.3	176.9	336.2	100.0

Out of the total of 336.2 *koruny* (\$6.72 billion) allocated under the original plan, 219 billion to 235 billion *koruny* was in net investment while the balance was for replacement costs.

In 1951, investment targets were raised to a total of 558 billion *koruny* in 1950 prices (\$11.16 billion). According to *Rude Pravo*, January 3, 1952, total investments for 1951 equalled 105 billion *koruny*, 50 percent above the originally planned average. The acceleration of the original Plan can be understood more clearly by examining 1949 and 1950 investments. *Rude Pravo* of February 25, 1951 reported that total industrial investments made during 1949 and 1950 were 125 billion *koruny*, or nearly the equivalent of the total amount allotted for industrial investments under the original Five Year Plan. Further, an additional 60 billion *koruny* taken from budgetary surpluses had been allocated to industrial investments.

* Production Index of 1948 equals 100.

** From the Government Memorandum on the Five Year Plan Act, No. 241, October 27, 1948, Ministry of Information and Public Culture, Prague, July, 1949.

On January 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* declared that investments for 1952 would exceed those for 1951 by 16.7 percent. It may therefore be assumed that 1952 investments would be 123 billion *koruny*. The following investment distribution for that year was given.

	Funds allotted (billion <i>koruny</i>)	Percentage of total (total = 100)
Heavy industry	53	43
Light industry	9	7
Transport	18	15
All other	43	35

The overall amount for 1952, 123 billion *koruny* in 1952 prices, would be equivalent to 24.6 billion new *koruny* in 1953 post-currency reform prices. However, annual investments planned for 1953 and 1954 were given as 23 billion *koruny* each, 1.6 billion *koruny* less.

The Revised 1953 Program

In a sweeping declaration on September 15, 1953, patterned on recent Soviet announcements, the Czechoslovak Communist regime enunciated a new policy and a simultaneous and far reaching reorganization of their cabinet. A summary of this program, as reported in the September 16 *Rude Pravo* (Prague), may be divided into three parts: 1. measures to be carried out this year; 2. directives for 1954; 3. admissions of serious shortcomings.

The program for 1953 had three main goals: reorientation of investment policies, reorientation of agricultural policy and raising the standard of living through socioeconomic reform.

Investment policy was given as follows:

1. The planned volume of capital investment in 1953 is to be reduced by 16.1 percent. Available funds are to be concentrated on increasing housing construction and production of primary products.

2. Agricultural investments are to be increased to 665 million *koruny* and credit to *kolkhozes* increased to 1 billion *koruny*.

3. The Ministry of Internal Trade is to increase its investments to a total of 111 million *koruny*, to be used for expanding and reorganizing retail trade facilities.

Agricultural policy was given as follows:

1. Additional investment funds were to be allotted for constructing rural shops and expanding facilities of MTS (machine tractor stations).

2. A moratorium of one to eight years is to be granted to *kolkhozes* on loans and interest payments due where *kolkhozes* have fallen into debt.

3. Delivery quotas for *kolkhozes* and independent farmers are to be revised, particularly for fodder grains, hay and straw. Beginning with 1954 compulsory quotas will be established for longer periods of time (they were generally applied by harvest) in order to facilitate longer term planning.

4. Small and medium farmers are to be helped to increase productivity by supplying them with additional MTS aid, allocation of artificial fertilizers, sale of selected seeds and increased opportunities for procuring agricultural implements. Credits are promised to independent farmers for land reclamation and cattle breeding projects.

5. Organized recruiting of labor in agricultural districts is to be reviewed. In districts where there is a shortage of farm labor, recruiting is to be immediately discontinued, but large scale campaigns are to be launched in areas with sufficient farm manpower, with a view to the voluntary resettlement of sparsely populated border regions.

6. A special agricultural development plan is to be drawn up for each of the 18 border districts, making up the regions of Budejovice, Pilsen, and Karlovy Vary. In these regions, kolkhozes will be granted special reduced rates by the MTS, and will be given aid in constructing farm buildings and purchasing artificial fertilizers. A graduated scale of bonuses are to be paid sovkhos personnel in those regions for cultivating fallow land.

7. To attract labor to the border areas, the supply of food and industrial products is to be improved and educational and cultural facilities expanded.

Numerous vaguely phrased promises of reform were issued, including statements on expanding apartment house construction, assisting home builders with credits, improving the quantity and quality of consumer goods, expanding and improving service and handicraft industries, etc.

The Program for 1954

The second part of the regime announcement dealt with the 1954 plan, where the following projections in investments were made:

1. Industrial production will be increased by 5.8 over the adjusted 1953 plan. Increase in capital goods production is not to exceed 6 percent of the adjusted 1953 plan, and that for consumer goods production is to be increased by 5.3 percent.

2. A total of approximately 23 billion *koruny* is to be invested during 1954. This is the same amount as was invested in 1953 but housing development is to be expanded by at least 15 percent in 1954. A proposed minimum of 40,000 dwelling units are to be completed in 1954, at least half of them to be equipped with central heating.

3. Machine tool production is to be augmented to exceed the adjusted 1953 plan by 7.9 percent, while consumer goods production is to be increased by 15 percent. Simultaneously, machinery and tool export is to be stepped up to exceed 1953 figures by 27.3 percent. This will facilitate increased raw material imports for industry as well as increased consumer goods imports.

4. Further investments provided for were: exploration, expansion of mineral production, research with particular emphasis on increasing fuel and raw material resources, increases in chemical production, expansion of metallurgical facilities, and increases in quantity, quality and

variety of goods produced in the wood, food and consumer industries.

The 1954 Agricultural Program

The following provisions were proposed for the 1954 agricultural program:

1. Consolidate kolkhozes with the help of the MTS stations. Increase assistance to small and medium farmers to boost overall farm production.

2. Concentrate on mechanization of heavy cultivation work.

3. Increase investment credits granted to kolkhozes by 38.8 percent over the augmented 1953 level. A 158 percent increase over the original 1953 plan of tractor imports from the USSR and Romania is projected.

4. Agricultural production is to be increased in border areas by increased investment, housing construction, etc.

The third section of the 1954 program was chiefly concerned with generalizations concerning raising the overall standard of living. These included improvement of retail trade, preparation for cuts in retail prices, increased consumer goods production, etc.

Shortcomings

In a speech delivered on September 15 in behalf of the Cabinet, Prime Minister Siroky gave a long list of shortcomings which had to be corrected if the "new economic policy" were to be more than a paper promise. Grave disproportions exist in industrial production; fuel and raw material production, as well as light industrial production, are all lagging. "Serious lags in agriculture . . . continue to create food difficulties and difficulties in supplying raw material to light industry. . . . While in 1953 industrial production will be double that of 1948, agricultural production will be only one-third higher, which is still below the pre-war level." The remainder of his speech was concerned with urging improvement of farm and livestock production, raising consumer living standards and pledging expansion of the housing construction program.

BULGARIA

According to Bulgarian Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov, industrial production during 1952 represented 55.9 percent of total production, with agriculture comprising the balance. The ratio between light and heavy industry in 1952 was 43.9 to 56.1 as compared with 20.6 to 79.4 in 1939. Mr. Chervenkov did not mention that the majority of Bulgaria's industrial goods were imported in 1939 and that although her industrial capacity has increased greatly since the pre-war period, the principal portion of her production is now being exported to the USSR and to other Soviet bloc countries. The character of the country's imports have also changed; consumer goods are not imported in pre-war quantities and emphasis is placed on capital equipment imports.

In the original post-war development program, the Bul-



Caption: Why is Comrade director not here on recreation? The mountains don't agree with him. Their silhouette keeps on reminding him how our plant is fulfilling the plan. . .

Květy (Prague), March 5, 1953

garian Two Year Plan, 45 percent of investment was devoted to mining and industry, 15 percent to transport and communications, 28 percent to building and public services and only 6 percent to agriculture. For an essentially agricultural country this was a drastic investment program. Further information on its extent, and on the proportion of industrial investment to overall investment, is contained in an article by Krastio Dobrev in the February 1953 issue of *Novo Vreme* (Sofia). Dobrev states that in 1951, 50.6 percent of all investments were industrial, with heavy industry being allocated 42.2 percent; capital investments in heavy industry had increased to 220.2 (1948 equals 100) while light industry investments had increased only to 129.6. These figures are made more meaningful by noting that in 1948, 40.2 percent of all industrial capital investment in Bulgaria was in heavy industry and that by 1951 it had increased to 53.4 percent.

The tempo of this rapid industrialization program has been much too fast and in his September 8, 1953 speech, Chervenkov admitted:

"In the second Five Year Plan, we cannot have either the former or a higher rate, but a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up consumer goods production and ensure still greater agricultural development. We have no need to tackle a task that would be beyond our strength, namely to develop all branches of heavy industry in our country.

"To speed consumer goods production, the government and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party consider it necessary to increase capital investments in light industry, agriculture, food processing, education, housing and other construction during the second Five Year Plan. In the next five years our workers will thereby be completely assured of having groceries and industrial goods, particularly meat, butter, sugar, milk, cheese, clothes, shoes, furniture and kitchen utensils."

The promise of a reorientation of Bulgarian investments

was repeated in *Rabotnichesko Delo's* (Sofia) September 18, 1953 editorial, "The Primary Tasks of Our Light and Food Industry."

"At this moment our party and Government are of the opinion that the relation between light and heavy industry should be changed a little and that more consumer goods should be produced, without, however, impairing the predominance in the production of capital equipment. In the near future, more financial resources will be diverted to the development of light and food industries. . . ."

The following table gives a breakdown of investments in the Five Year Plan in percentages. A sum of 425 billion *leva* (old) was originally allocated. Inasmuch as the Plan was completed a year earlier, in 1952, the sum invested amounted only to 362.5 billion *leva* (old) or 14.5 billion *leva* (new), approximately \$2.1 billion.

Distribution of Investment Outlay*

(total investment = 100)

Agriculture and Forestry	17.9
Heavy Industry	36.0
Light Industry	7.1
Transport and Communications	18.8
Housing	4.5
Social and Cultural	5.2
Internal Trade	0.7
Miscellaneous	**9.8

According to the report of Minister of Finance Kiril Lazarov, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), February 3, 1953, the budget for financing the Plan in 1953 will amount to 10.5 billion *leva* (approximately \$1.5 billion). Almost half of the funds allotted will be used to finance capital investments, which will amount to 22 percent increase by volume over 1952. This appropriation will probably be somewhat modified after Chervenkov's recent pronouncements, but it is unlikely that the revisions will be major and it is still too soon to observe any concrete results.

POLAND

As have the other Soviet bloc nations, Poland has made concerted efforts towards industrialization. Within her pre-war boundaries, Poland was principally agricultural, but with the acquisition of the Western Territories, the balance was considerably changed. The industrial level of pre-war Poland was about equal to 70 percent of the 1938 industrial level for the present area of the country. For propaganda purposes, the Communists insist on comparing post-war statistics with the pre-war ones. In December 1948, the then Minister of Industry Minc declared the proportion of industrial to agricultural production was 64 to 36 as compared with 45.5 to 54.5 in 1937. Further, he stated that the proportion of capital goods to consumer goods was 47 to 53 in 1937 and 54 to 46 in 1948. All post-war planning in Poland, past and present, has emphasized heavy industry. In 1948 Mr. Minc said that the Three

* Source is *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1953.

** Includes roads, bridges, waterworks and other public works included under State and other public investment.

Year Plan target for heavy industry was 250 percent of the 1938 level for pre-war Poland and for consumer goods only 125 percent.

This trend continued in organization of the Six Year Plan where a total of 198.39 billion *zlotys* (approximately \$49.6 billion) was allotted. Approximately 54 percent of the investments were devoted to industry and 76.1 percent of that to heavy industry. Industrialization was further accelerated by raising the proportions for industrial investments in the annual plans. The Communists hoped to complete the Six Year Plan in five years but plan fulfillments indicate that this has been unsuccessful and the trend is toward reversion to the original plan.

The following table shows the structure of investments in percentages in the Three Year Plan and compares it to the Six Year Plan.

Distribution of Investment Outlay*
(total investment = 100)

				Original Plan 1950-	Revised Plan	
	1946	1947	1949	1955	1952	1953
Industry, Mining, and Building Enterprises	29.1	35.4	43.1	45.4	56.8	55.6
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	15.6	15.9	11.0	11.9	8.2	9.0
Transport and Communications	40.8	27.5	18.4	14.9	12.6	13.5
Internal Trade	1.2	2.2	5.1	4.2	3.4	2.9
Housing and Communal Buildings**	5.4	9.6	12.7	11.5	13.6	13.9
Cultural and Social Investments	5.0	6.4	7.6	8.8	4.3	4.3
Miscellaneous	2.9	3.0	2.1	3.3	1.1	0.8

The Polish government's investment policies were recently summarized in an article by Dr. Kazimierz Secomski, Director of Investments on the Polish State Planning Commission, which appeared in the February 1953 edition of the Commission's publication, *Inwestycje i Budownictwo* (Investments and Construction). Secomski divides Polish investment policy into four distinct periods:

1. From 1944-1946, a period characterized by the necessity to employ quick, temporary measures to mobilize industrial and other productive facilities, partly damaged by the war, which might easily be repaired.

2. The Three Year Plan period, 1947-1949, consisting of a rapid and quantitative development of investment and construction directed toward reconstructing a war-damaged economy.

* Source is *Plan Szescioletni*, Part I, Warsaw, 1952, and *Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, Warsaw, January-February, 1953.

** Increase in communal economy investments is explained by Secomski by increased investments in waterworks and housing construction in Silesia, Lodz, Warsaw and other new "Socialist" cities like Nowa Huta and Nowe Tychy, as well as in the construction of the Warsaw Underground.

3. The first half of the Six Year Plan period, 1949-1952, characterized by considerable increase in investment tasks and goals through undertaking new and difficult programs which require modern production and construction methods.

4. Poland is now entering the fourth stage emphasizing completion of projected undertakings with concentration on large industrial installations.

The above table demonstrates that industrial investments have shown a steady increase from 1946 to the present, when a levelling off is taking place. Transport and communications, emphasized in the immediate post-war period, are now being deemphasized. The portion of funds allotted to agriculture has also shown a steady decline.

Secomski points out that if we add the investments for housing construction, professional schools and social installations for industry employees, the total sum spent on industrial investments will read 61.0 percent for 1952 and 62.2 percent for 1953. Further, his agricultural figure refers only to State investments, and he estimates that the total State and private investments in agriculture will increase by 29.3 percent. This estimate may be called into serious question since individual farmers' investments are exceedingly difficult to anticipate.

The following table gives further information on investment development.*

	1950	1951	1952	1953
Original Goals Set Under Six Year Plan	148	191	239	278
Revised Goals Set in Annual Plans	149	219	275	320
Plan Fulfillment	150	214	**256	—


It will be noted that the proposed goals for the original Six Year Plan were increased considerably in the annual plans from 1951 through 1953. Plan fulfillments in 1951 and 1952 did not equal the targets set in the annual plans but were over those for the original Six Year Plan. Because of the lack of fulfillment of the individual (revised) plans in 1951 and 1952, it may be assumed that the fulfillment of the 1953 plan will be little more than the goal set for 1952 or equal to the original goal set in the Six Year Plan for 1953.

An article by W. Generalov, published in *Financii i Kredit SSSR*, No. 8, 1953, also points to a decrease in Polish investments. Generalov, in discussing the Polish 1953 budget, states that "the number of investments or installations to be built was decreased in order to concentrate fiscal means on building the main Socialist constructions." Among those investments Generalov mentioned were, foundries: Nowa Huta, Bobrek, Kosciuszko, Pokoj, Batory; power stations: Zeran, Jaworzno II, and the au-

* 1949 equals 100.

** Estimated by Secomski in *Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, January-February 1953.

Polish Six Year Plan Investment



(Reproduced from *Geografia w Szkole*, No. 3, May-June, 1953)

tomobile factories in Lublin and Warsaw, as well as some other important industrial undertakings.

Minor modifications in Polish investment policy may take place, but it is unlikely that overall aims will be changed. As regards the structure of investments, no obvious changes are apparent. As in 1952, investments are still principally concentrated in industry.

ROMANIA

Formal economic planning did not begin in Romania until 1949. From 1945 to 1948, efforts were directed toward producing goods for reparations to the USSR, and since the Soviets were less interested in consumer goods and light industries, the emphasis was on heavy industrial development. Romania also differed from the other Satellites in that its planning was not inaugurated with a two or three year plan, but with two one year plans, for 1949 and 1950 respectively. These plans were then followed by a Five Year Plan which began in 1951 and is scheduled to run through 1955.

Romania's investment program has been concentrated on the development of heavy industry. Funds allotted for the 1949 plan were divided as follows: 36.8 percent to mining and heavy industry; 10.4 percent to light industry; and only 9.4 percent to agriculture. This plan, as well as those that followed, was ambitious and demanded heavy sacrifices in light and consumer goods industries. The planned investments for 1949 and 1950 were 4.1 billion lei (\$0.37 billion) and 8.5 billion lei (\$0.77 billion) respectively, while investments for the Five Year Plan were given as 66.5 billion lei (\$6 billion). Unlike some of the other Soviet bloc countries, Romania did not have an accelerated Five Year Plan. The acceleration of the plans in the other countries got under way at about the same time Romania's plan was inaugurated, and the faster industrialization tempo had already been incorporated into it.

Gheorghiu-Dej's August 23 speech may be interpreted as the official inauguration of a change in investment policy. The Romanian Premier admitted that the pace of industrialization, particularly in heavy industry, had been too great for the country's capacity and that investment allocations had not been adapted to the best needs of the Romanian economy. He stated that the tempo imposed for completion of the heavy industrialization program demanded accumulation of huge investment funds which were both out of proportion to the national income as well as far exceeding the upped provisions of the Five Year Plan. The result of this speedup was an unbalanced economy, a disproportionate growth of heavy industry and a consumer goods industry trailing behind.

Gheorghiu-Dej promised that the State and the Party would reduce the share of national income allotted for new investment to 27.8 percent and would increase to 72.2 percent the share available for satisfying "the material and cultural needs of the workers." He stated further:

"The improvement of our economic policy must mean better distribution of materials and particularly of capital investments, leading to the harmonious development of all branches of the national economy. . . . Of the total investments, reductions are to be made in funds earmarked for heavy industry and other works; a fund of 5 billion lei is to be allotted to the development of agricultural production, the consumer goods industry, the construction of dwellings, and to other social and cultural works. The proportion of investments for the consumer goods industry and for agriculture will be doubled by the end of 1955 as compared to 1953. . . . With regard to heavy industry, special emphasis will be placed on those branches which have a sure raw materials base. Raw material reserves must be increased and efforts made to discover new resources."

Plan Comparisons

The following table compares the distribution of investment funds for the 1949 and 1950 plans with that for the original and recently "modified" schedules for the Five Year Plan. This recent "modification," which reversed the former trend of increasing percentages of investment funds being allocated to industry and particularly to heavy industry, is the result of a serious economic situation which Prime Minister Gheorghiu-Dej has been forced to take notice of, and which seems to be a part of a Soviet-sponsored scheme for the entire orbit.

Distribution of Investment Outlay*
(total investment = 100)

	Annual Plans		Five Year Plan (1951-1955)	
	1949	1950	Original Plan	Modified Plan
Agricultural and Forestry	9.4	6.6	10.0	13.1
Heavy Industry and Mining	36.8	44.8	44.1	34.1
Light Industry	10.4	5.4	9.3	14.1
Transport and Communications	21.2	15.4	16.2	16.2
Internal Trade	1.7	1.7	2.2	2.2
Housing and Communal Buildings	**	5.2	***3.2	5.2
Cultural and Social Investments	11.2	10.1	10.2	10.2
Miscellaneous	9.3	10.8	4.8	4.9

Among the further promises made in the Gheorghiu-Dej speech were:

* Sources are: "The Plan of the Romanian People's Republic for 1949," Bucharest, 1949; *Official Bulletin*, No. 85, December 30, 1949; *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 16, 1950; *Official Bulletin*, December 16, 1950; *Scanteia* August 23, 1953; *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1953.

** Not given separately in 1949.

*** Only workers' dwellings were included; other housing investments were dealt with under the heading "Cultural and Social Investments."

1) Increased investments in the food industry for 1953-1955. A 40 to 60 percent rise over 1953 in 1954 (1.8 billion lei as compared to .98 billion) is predicted for meat, fish, edible oils and sugar.

2) Textile and shoe industry investments are to amount to about 1.2 billion lei for the period up to 1955. Production should double: by 1955 shoe production should exceed 10 million pairs; textile production for 1954 is given as 210 million square meters, and 250 million square meters for 1955.

3) Handicraft and consumer cooperatives were promised increased credits and investments so they could contribute to increasing the supply of consumer goods.

4) Approximately 6 billion lei is to be provided for developing agricultural production from 1953-1955, which is twice the amount invested in 1950-1953.

The widely publicized version of the speeded-up Plan (fulfilling the Five Year Plan in four years) will have to be scrapped if the new program is to be anything more

than a paper policy. The tempo of industrialization will, no doubt, be slackened but aside from the Danube-Black Sea Canal project, it seems unlikely that any of the major construction projects will be abandoned completely. This general slow down will permit some investment funds to be shifted from heavy industrial projects to consumer goods production.

To say that the USSR has abandoned its plans for industrializing the Satellites is premature, but that modifications of policy, and perhaps even a new policy, are being shaped is apparent. That this policy has the political purpose of allaying mass dissatisfaction is not to deny that it may simultaneously have economic content. The Communists may be launched on a program to make more secure their food supply, a major problem since they took power in 1917. But whether securing their food supply is a "relaxation" or a preparation for war or a genuine attempt to realign the Satellite economies with their natural industrial bases it is still too early to say.

How They See Us

IN THEIR aggressive plans for the unleashing of a new war, American imperialists devote a good deal of attention to the preparation of human reserves for the army. Therefore, the United States is introducing militarization and Fascism in the schools, where sports are entrusted with a major role in the military education of the American pupil. . . . American sports are notoriously immoral and vicious. Rudeness, bloodshed and murder are the most characteristic features of U.S. sport, manifested particularly in American football

games—those desperate brawls aimed at inciting the lowest instincts of both players and spectators. These properties are inherent not only in professional football, but in the school teams composed of boys from 11 to 16 years of age. . . ."

—Czechoslovakian Sport (Prague), September 16, 1953



The Chervenkov Bid

“WE FIND no justification for the fact that the United States severed diplomatic relations with our country in 1949 and still does not want to renew them.” These words, spoken by Bulgarian Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov in Sofia’s National Theatre on September 8, signified a tactical change in Bulgarian foreign policy. Chervenkov’s entire speech, which included promises to raise the national living standard as well as the demand that Bulgaria be admitted to the UN, was an integral part of the Communists’ post-Stalin campaign to present a more peaceful front abroad and a more tolerant face at home.

Diplomatic relations between the US and Bulgaria were actually severed by the US State Department on February 20, 1950, after the Bulgarian government had persistently refused to retract its demand that Donald R. Heath, American Minister in Sofia, be recalled. The Communists declared that Mr. Heath was guilty of conspiring with the “traitor,” Traicho Kostov, and had thereby interfered in Bulgaria’s internal affairs to the detriment of her independence and national security.

Kostov, the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party during Georgi Dimitrov’s long exile in the USSR, and second-highest ranking Communist next to Dimitrov, was eliminated for advocating “national” communism, just as Gomulka was purged in Poland and Rajk in Hungary. As a result of his defiance of Moscow, Kostov was sent to the gallows on December 16, 1949, on the charge that he had conspired to overthrow the Bulgarian government and had conducted espionage for the US and Yugoslavia.

Mr. Heath denied having had any connections with Kostov, but the Bulgarian government still insisted on his recall. On January 20, 1950, the US State Department rejected the Bulgarian charges as “wholly unfounded,” and requested that the demand be withdrawn. The Bulgarian government refused, and one month later, the US State Department sent a note breaking off diplomatic relations. The note contained the following:

“Diplomatic relations between the United States and the postwar government of Bulgaria, since their establishment in September 1947, have not been on a basis which could be called friendly or cordial. Cordiality was scarcely to be expected when Bulgarian officials and the controlled press were constantly denouncing and insulting the United States, while Bulgaria was violating its peace treaty obligations and ignoring resolutions of the United Nations.”

The note referred to the General Assembly resolution of October 22, 1949, which expressed concern about Bulgaria’s failure to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. According to Article 2 of the peace treaty, Bulgaria was supposed to “take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Bulgarian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.” As a result of these violations and the expulsion of Mr. Heath, the US State Department decided that it was no longer possible to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the Bulgarian government.

The New Approach

Chervenkov’s recent request that diplomatic relations with the US be renewed must be considered part of Bulgaria’s desire to gain admission to the UN and to strengthen her position in the Balkans. This position has been seriously threatened by the Balkan Pact including Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian government, more than any other Soviet Satellite, has continually denounced the Pact as a means of “unleashing aggression against the People’s Democracies and the USSR.” It is clear that Chervenkov’s September 8 overtures to the US, as well as to Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, were in effect an attempt to undermine the Balkan Pact. They were made in connection with the Soviet “peace offensive,”

and on the basis of the Bulgarian government's alleged desire to settle all international problems by negotiation: the implication was that the Balkan Pact is an effort to find a solution through war.

Another factor which has undoubtedly contributed to the Bulgarian government's feeling of insecurity and inspired these overtures, is internal unrest behind the Iron Curtain. Several months ago, anti-Communist demonstrations influenced Moscow to launch a new conciliatory domestic policy and to make promises about raising the captive people's living standard. Insofar as Bulgaria is concerned, popular discontent is doubly dangerous in view of the unity of her Balkan neighbors, and of the effect this unity could have on suppressed Bulgarians. That the government is aware of this is evident from recent propaganda linking Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy. *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 18, wrote: "If the main concern of the Communist Party and the Government in the realm of domestic policy is directed towards a further uplift in the people's economy and a sharp increase in the material and cultural level of the workers, the main problem in the realm of foreign policy is guaranteeing the peaceful labor of the Bulgarian people." By stressing its concern for the people's welfare and by proclaiming peace as a prerequisite for the new policy, the regime is obviously trying to allay internal unrest.

Tension in the Balkans

Furthermore, through the resumption of diplomatic relations with the US, the Bulgarian government hopes to create favorable conditions for the nation's admission into the UN. Although Bulgaria has tried to become a member for some time, she has never obtained the required number of votes, and doubts have frequently been expressed as to her willingness and ability to carry out the obligations of the UN Charter. On September 18, *Rabotnichesko Delo* attempted to reassure the people of Bulgaria's adherence to UN principles: "Without being accepted into the UN, Bulgaria has, through a number of agreements already concluded, undertaken obligations to guide its international relations in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; her acceptance into the World Organization will eliminate an injustice and assist in further easing international tension, particularly in the Balkan sector." Easing Balkan tension is also the reason given for resuming relations with the US.

As for the Balkan countries themselves, Chervenkov is now pursuing a so-called good neighbor policy. On September 18, *Rabotnichesko Delo* declared: "Bulgaria wishes to live with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in peace, and is ready to negotiate with them so that all existing problems may be solved, all misunderstandings eliminated, so that our relations may become those of good neighbors, because the creation of good neighborly relations is of vital interest to all Balkan countries." And Chervenkov himself on September 8 claimed that Bulgaria has no aspirations

with regard to her neighbors and "does not want to impose her regime on anyone."

Unfriendly Neighbors

While Bulgaria's relations with her Balkan neighbors are generally poor, relations with Greece are worse than those with Turkey or Yugoslavia. Ever since 1941, when the Nazis invaded Greece from Bulgaria, the two countries have not had any diplomatic relations. In the first place, Bulgaria has not complied with the peace treaty. And secondly, Bulgaria was a principal base for Greek Communist guerrillas, and is now suspected of being the point from which the defeated guerrillas smuggle spies across the border. According to recent information, the Greek government will meet with the Bulgarian government in Paris to negotiate for resumption of diplomatic relations. The Greek government will probably submit the following topics for discussion: that Bulgaria reduce her armed forces in accordance with the peace treaty; pay Greece 45 million dollars in war reparations; make restitution for damages and thefts of Greek property during the occupation; disarm the frontier region bordering on Greece; liberate Greek military prisoners and hostages held on Bulgarian territory; return abducted Greek children kidnapped by the Communist guerrillas; and stop giving aid to Communist guerrillas. A resumption of trade between the two countries has already been agreed upon, and negotiations for a trade agreement are in progress.

Certain conditions have also aggravated Bulgaria's relations with Turkey. In 1950, the Bulgarian government decided to resettle its Turkish minority in Turkey. This move was probably decided upon for security reasons and for fear that the Turkish population would not be absorbed into the Communist system. Although the Turkish government was willing to agree to this transfer in principle, it wanted the opportunity to screen immigrants and to solve the social and economic problems involved in the resettlement. The Bulgarian government was in favor of a quick resettlement which would make thorough screening impossible and which would probably give them the chance to smuggle Communist spies into Turkey. Although the Turkish government has taken strong measures to put a stop to resettlement before final arrangements are made, Bulgaria has succeeded in resettling 151,000 of her 650,000 Turkish inhabitants.

As for Yugoslavia, it is clear that the differences between the two countries stem from Tito's break with the Kremlin. Border incidents have further contributed to the tension, although a Bulgarian-Yugoslav Border Committee is now functioning, with the task of solving all border disputes.

In any case, it is difficult to see how peaceful relations can be established in the Balkans if the Communists make no more than tactical changes in their foreign policy. And, so far, the Communists have not indicated that their shifts are anything more than tactical.



Radio Free Europe

Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 21 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations. The scripts below are excerpts from programs prepared by freedom-loving exiles from Central and East Europe, and beamed by RFE to its target countries.


This is the Voice of Free Bulgaria . . .

CHERVENKOV'S SCHOOLHOUSES

ON SEPTEMBER 8, Vulko Chervenkov proudly announced: "The Government has decided to close down ten of the nineteen prisons built by the monarcho-fascists in our country; and, because they are not needed, to turn the buildings over to cultural and economic organizations for their use."

According to Chervenkov's happy picture, Bulgaria now has only nine "Fascist-built" prisons, while the remaining ten—and presumably tens of concentration camps—have been turned into nurseries, libraries and other cultural institutes. We would like to be able to believe Chervenkov's fables and to picture life in Communist-ruled Bulgaria in such an idyllic way. Now that Chervenkov has begun to talk about transforming the prisons into cultural and social institutes, we would like to hear some details about this highly humane and benevolent act. Let Chervenkov describe to us the appearance of these old familiar buildings—the prisons in Bulgaria. You should not forget that many of us exiles experienced in varying degrees the charms of the Communist paradise, and we cherish some nostalgic feelings about these educational institutions for polishing the personality and re-educating the people in the highly humane teachings of Lenin and Stalin. We would like to know, for instance, about the gorgeous Central Prison, located at 124 General Stoletov Street, where Nikola Petkov was hanged. Until April of this year, the Central Prison of Sofia had about 5,000 inmates, half of them political prisoners. We would like to know if this prison has been included in Chervenkov's noble gesture. . .

We are also wondering if it was simply by mistake that Chervenkov failed to mention the ominous Malashevski Prison, 12 kilometers east of Sofia, which the government surrounded with concealing shrubbery to insure the peace and rest of its 800 inmates, most of them political prisoners. Furthermore, we are interested in the health of its respected warden, Captain Ivanov, and his faithful assistant, Lieutenant Bobchev.



Did Vulko Chervenkov have in mind the Bourgas District prison situated in a place called Piasatizite, where more than 600 inmates, most of them political prisoners, are enjoying the sea breezes and the wise instructions of its warden, Captain Bonev, and his assistant, Sergeant Dimitar Gadulov? . . .

We would like to pose the same questions about the Haskovo prison which has about 750 inmates under the supervision of

Miho Mihov and Chief Guard Valcho Dimitrov, as well as about the Stara Zagora prison with over 650 inmates.

We would also like to hear something about the two Shumen prisons—the old one, and the new one with its tiny cells, each originally intended for one prisoner, but for sanitary reasons accommodating two and sometimes three. It is a prison where the bread ration is only 125 grams daily and where the majority of "retired people" are former Agrarian Party leaders.

We do not have the time to mention details about the remaining prisons, which probably no longer exist as such, especially since Chervenkov has assured us of it. Nevertheless, we will list them for the record: the prisons located in Russe, Plovdiv, Gorna-Djumaia, Vratza, Pazardjik, Pleven, Kustendil, Yambol, Varna, etc. We must also add the more than thirty-five concentration camps to this list: so

that the finishing touches may be applied to the wonderful picture painted by Chervenkov, and so the Bulgarian people may collectively sing praises to Chervenkov for his fatherly efforts to transform the prisons into institutions for cultural advancement. . . .

POTATO FAMINE

As you know, the government purchasing agents in the potato collection centers must submit regular reports on the potato deliveries to the notorious Communist Economic Planning Committee. When report after report came in claiming that "the Plan is being overfulfilled," the heads of the Committee began to suspect that possibly these plans were being fulfilled only on paper. They ordered an investigation. The government soon found out that the potato storage centers were practically empty! The explanation for this common Communist phenomenon was the simplified bookkeeping introduced by the purchasing agents. What kind of procedure was it? Very simple, and most effective!

In order to give you a better picture we urge you to imagine a warehouse—a two-story building. This is how the purchasing agents worked: They ordered the peasants to deliver their quotas on the first floor, where they figured the amount of money to be paid to each peasant according to government-established prices. Many peasants were unable to produce enough potatoes to meet their quotas; therefore, they were compelled to buy them on the free market. In order to "help" the peasants in their efforts to buy potatoes, the purchasing agents sold at "free market rates" the potatoes already stored on the second floor of the building! In this way everybody was allegedly satisfied, although the peasants were swindled.

One day the agents asked themselves: "Why should we burden the farmers with extra work? Why should they buy potatoes on the second floor and then deliver them on the first? Soviet science has taught us easier and faster methods!" And so they developed a new system. They called the peasants and said: "From now on you do not have to buy potatoes on the second floor. The new procedure is simple and most convenient. Here, for instance, is Bai Ivan. He is required to deliver 1000 kilograms of potatoes but has produced only 400 kilograms. This means that he is 600 kilograms short. However, we don't want him to suffer! He does not have to look for more potatoes!"

"Thank God," said Bai Ivan with relief. Believing that it was all over, he started for the door. But the agents stopped him: "Wait a minute, Bai Ivan. You have to be paid for your 400 kilograms of potatoes!"

"All right, if you say so, I will not refuse money."

"You will get your money when the time comes; however, now you must pay the difference for the 600 kilos of undelivered potatoes."

Bai Ivan looked at the agents in astonishment.

"What is the matter with you, Bai Ivan? Are you so stupid that you cannot make the most simple calculation? Listen, you are required to deliver 1000 kilos of potatoes. You have delivered only 400. You must deliver 600 kilos more. We have relieved you of buying them on the 'kulak' market; you must fulfill your obligation another way.

"The state owes you 160 leva for the 400 kilos. However, we shall sell you, on paper, of course, the other 600 kilos which you are short. You will pay for them at current prices, which are to your advantage! The 600 kilos will cost you 480 leva. Don't look at me like a fool! Get a pencil and paper and figure it out! The state owes you 160 leva while you owe us 480 leva. In other words, you have to pay the difference of 320 leva! Is that clear? We shall have collected your potato quota!"

Poor Bai Ivan took out his wallet but found he had no money. He borrowed some from his friends, paid 320 leva to the purchasing agents, and left the building more despondent than ever before.

That is the end of the story; however, we would like to disclose the happy side of it too. After the investigation was started, the Communist government found out that the potato delivery quota was fulfilled only on paper—that there was not a single potato in the warehouse. The responsible authorities made an official report and sent it to the Party, for the purchasing agents were very active Party members. We do not know yet whether the racketeers were punished as criminals or simply dismissed from their jobs. Rumors have it that they were sent to prison or to concentration camps for "repentance." Others say they were appointed experts in the Ministry of Finance!

We know little about their fate, but we do care whether or not they catch other victims in their web. The people know their names. The people remember and will keep silent until the day of retribution arrives!

Spot Announcement

"Marshall Plan": two words which every Czechoslovak knows. But few know that by refusing this economic aid, Czechoslovakia was deprived by the Cominform of 1300 million dollars. If, with 1300 million dollars, we bought only meat, every Czechoslovak would have two more kilograms (five lbs.) of meat a month for as long as five years.

This is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

THE NATION CAN DEPEND ON ITS ARMY


On July 22, in Katowice, the Polish People's Army paraded before the Soviet Marshal Rokossovski, who now wears the uniform of a Polish officer. The faces of the soldiers are "bright with happiness," sing the commentators of the regime radio. The basis of the strength of the Polish People's Army is the close link uniting it with the nation. Commanders of units are the faithful and devoted sons of their country. With a sense of pride, they fulfill the honorable service of a soldier. The Party and the nation can always depend upon them.

That is the situation in the Polish Army, as presented

by the regime's propaganda. And, as is often the case with Soviet propaganda, there is in all this one basic truth which has managed to creep through despite the intentions of the propagandists. The nation can always depend on its army. The nation, but not the Party. For the Polish soldier parading before a Soviet marshal is filled with Polish traditions, and feels with a Polish heart. This soldier knows from his own experience, perhaps even better than his civilian countrymen, that the Communist Party is separated from the rest of the community by a wall of hatred and distrust. And that is the essence of the Polish soldier's tragedy. For the civilian reads in the imposed Communist Constitution that "service in the People's Army is the highest honor." The civilian listens daily to proclamations of the regime's faith in the Polish People's Army and its loyalty. He hears that only the "hand-picked," the "best," serve in this army. And he naturally assumes that they are those who have sold themselves to the regime and to the Russian occupiers. On the other hand, the soldier in this army, cut off by his superiors from contact with the outside world, deprived of the human, natural conditions of family life and daily work, feels like a chained dog—wronged and humiliated.

A chained dog—that is the definition I heard a short time ago from a Polish refugee, formerly a junior officer in Rokossovski's army. "I think that we, the junior officers in the Polish People's Army, are in the most difficult position," he told me. "Our superiors extract every ounce of strength from us, and civilians point at us in the streets. They consider us their inferiors. We are becoming increasingly estranged from our fellow countrymen."

This is what this junior officer, whose face the Warsaw radio commentator described as "bright with happiness," told me. It is impossible to quote all the facts that this officer related. Let us take just a few examples. Junior officers are treated as a class of worker whose working hours are not strictly defined. They have no set holidays or free time. Their leave depends upon the whim of the regimental commander, for a platoon commander is considered too insignificant a figure to be allowed to choose the time when he would like to take his leave. He is also too unimportant to be allowed the use of the recreation homes, which are officially at the disposal of all officers. In practice, they are filled with staff officers from the Ministry of National Defense and senior military commanders. In practice, the junior officer is given no opportunity to leave the camp, and no opportunity to improve his education. He has no time in which to do these things. From five in the morning until eleven at night his day is filled with professional and political duties. Second Lieutenant Grzyb, an infantry officer who escaped to the West and whom you have heard on our previous broadcasts, used to begin his working day with reveille at 5 a.m. and went to bed at 11 p.m.—six hours sleep is all a junior officer is entitled to. And Second Lieutenant Jazwinski, a pilot who escaped in a MIG to Denmark in May, has told you how his duties lasted from dawn until 3 a.m. on one day, and how, after four hours' sleep, he had to be on parade at 7.20 a.m., ready for new duties.



"[German armament factories] hidden by the smoke screen of the lies of 'Radio Free Europe.'"

Rude Pravo (Prague), September 25, 1953

There is a definite method in this madness. Officers are divided into two quite separate classes. The junior officers, often the products of so-called "social promotion," are given neither the time nor the opportunity to broaden their general studies or vocational training. They are purposely kept on a semi-educated level, and forced to repeat unthinkingly a dozen slogans from the writing of Marx. Their thinking is to be done for them by the senior officers who are, as is well known, mostly newcomers from the Soviet Army. These men show little tact in their dealings with the junior officer. During an inspection, they will insult him in front of his troops, and abuse him in foul language. In this way an attitude of contempt for the junior officer is fostered among the soldiers, and the contempt of the junior officer for his superior is increased.

That is why the remark of the regime radio commentator about the faces of the soldiers being "bright with happiness" is so outrageous. And at the same time, there is a deep truth in the statement that the nation can always depend on its army. There is truth in the words of Rokossovski, who said on July 22: "The minds and hearts of our soldiers are filled with the same desire, the same determination that our Fatherland should grow in strength, that our Polish lands should blossom. . . ." That is so. But the meaning behind this sentiment is different in the case of Rokossovski and in the case of the mass of Polish soldiers. The former, when he speaks of our Polish lands and of their development, sees them as an area for Soviet experimentation and imperialistic exploitation. The junior officers of the Polish Army and the mass of Polish soldiers are gazing along the trail blazed by Jarecki and Jazwinski and

Radio Free Europe

Second Lieutenant Grzyb. The Polish nation will not be disappointed in its army, seeing in the deeds of these young officers a symbol of the unbreakable will and unwavering faith in the true freedom and independence of our country.

Spot Announcement

On April 20, 1950, Rudolf Slansky declared:

"Joint Agricultural Cooperatives which are not joined voluntarily by farmers do not have a firm foundation."

Slansky was executed for the very thing which today is being said by Antonin Zapotocky.

This is the Voice of Free Hungary . . .

NEW LAND OF PLENTY?

Many kinds of imported goods have recently been put on the market, reports the [Hungarian] Women's Magazine; and we read the list of them with growing delight. What are the goods which have been unavailable in the People's Democracy and which from now on will be available in such abundance? Well, for example, imported goods such as pepper, laurel-leaves, nutmeg and aniseed. So far, says the Women's Magazine, housewives have had to manage without these, although they bore the discomfort cheerfully in the faith that some day they would be able to get them. Shortly there will be vanilla and several kinds of coffee. Finally there will be cocoa and different kinds of chocolate! All these things were not to be had in the People's Democracy until the recent economic reform, although we had read 1,617,629 times that it was a "workers' paradise." Now the new trade policy of our country makes this surplus in foreign goods possible. Ten varieties of German stationery have already arrived and can be purchased in the shops. Excellent cosmetic creams, among them a shaving cream, have also arrived from Grotewohl's country. If within a short time we manage to purchase foreign razor blades, combining the fine shaving cream with the fine foreign blades, then it will at last be possible to shave in the People's Democracy. People's Democracies are capable of anything. In addition to all these, many steel and iron articles from Germany have arrived: screwdrivers, can-openers, and (believe it or not) beautiful bathroom scales. A few weeks ago the wonderful Soviet "Pobjeda" wrist watches also appeared on the market. So far it has not proved necessary to summon the police to keep order among the crowds rushing to buy these watches. If they ever brought back the confiscated Western watches, customer interest would, no doubt, be much greater.

We can hardly believe the following announcement: they want to import women's shoes made of real leather. It is a fantastic supposition that someone in East Germany makes footwear out of real leather—and then ex-

ports it. We are equally amazed at the new German fabric which has come to the shops in the past few days. The fabric is 130 centimeters wide. That is within the realm of imagination; but not that it has been sent in 16 beautiful shades. The rainbow itself has only seven colors, but this German shantung has 16. And all these wonders will arrive shortly. They will simply be imported. Workers can go into shops, take out their wallets, and buy whatever they like. We are overwhelmed.

It is only with the greatest sensation—soap—that we are not impressed. They say you can actually find it in the shops right now for seven forints 40 fillers. We respectfully ask the authorities of the People's Democracy: Why so late? Could you not import soap before, or make it yourselves to give to the workers? Did a drastic reform program have to be launched in order to get ordinary bath soap into the shops? And finally we ask: What had Soviet experience to do with the fact that at last you have succeeded in providing consumers with decent bath soap?

Spot Announcement

Parents cannot always compensate their children for the academic education which the Communist school withholds from them. Parents can, however, see that the school does not cripple the character of their children.

This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

MESSAGES HOME

Seven days a week, the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia carries a fifteen-minute program half of which is dedicated to broadcasting confirmed reports about informers, the other half to relaying coded messages from escapees and refugees to their homeland. The original daily program is repeated four times, at approximately three-hour intervals, Monday through Saturday; twice, once in the late morning and once in the early evening, on Sunday. The messages below represent samplings from a typical day's program.

This is password *Little Garden*—dear mother, I was worried about you; I had not heard from you for so long. Now I have had news on the situation of all of you at home. We know that these are the worst times you have ever lived through, but you must believe that one day we will see you again.

This is password *Hephaistos*—calling my friends from the Moravsky Krumlov area. The border crossing was hard and exhausting, but it was a success. Now I am well, and I see true freedom. You may trust that true freedom will return to our country. I have registered for Canadian immigration. Tell my parents that I regret I did not say goodbye to them. Give my regards to all, especially my parents. Listen again in two months.

This is password *Traviata*. I am with you always in my thoughts; I embrace you. I live solely for my work; during the day I work at my beloved profession and in the evenings I study. In the second half of the month I shall send you an important message. Please listen to the messages regularly, every week. Listen also to the other programs of this station.

This is password *Across the Birch Avenue*—calling the Chrudim area. Mother; dearest friends! I greet you from the free world. I am fine. How is our little Bojarek? Listen again on my name day.

This is password *Kita and Manek*—calling the Jihlava region. Greetings and remembrances to our parents and to all dear friends. I am well and happy. Listen again next month at the same hour.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS IN THE WEST

In this program refugees from Czechoslovakia are regularly interviewed about the details of their life in America. A summary of two interviews follows. When it is necessary to protect relatives in Czechoslovakia real names are not used.

Adolf Lesovsky is a painter. He worships Alfons Mucha and considers himself his pupil. Lesovsky has worked in the movies as an art adviser. Now he does technical illustration. He draws airplane machinery, diagramming the functions of the various parts to help pilots learn the working of each part of modern aircraft. In addition, he devotes every free moment to his old love, painting themes from nature and allegory. Together with his wife, he takes an active part in the work of various Czechoslovak societies in Los Angeles.

According to the Lesovskys, our countrymen in Los Angeles lead very active lives. The local Sokol and the Masaryk Alliance are particularly strong. Lectures and amateur theatricals are given frequently. Last year they celebrated October 28 by producing a play written by Mr. Lesovsky entitled "We Live and We Shall Live." The play was very successful and other centers of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States have expressed interest in it. There are nine Czech and four Slovak societies in Los Angeles. By now they consist of three age groups. The oldest use the Czech or Slovak language in their work and play, the middle-aged use both languages, and the young prefer to speak only English, even if they still understand Czech or Slovak.

There are at least 5,000 Czechs and Slovaks in Los Angeles—even 10,000 according to some estimates—a third of whom are Slovaks. The bond between the Czechs and Slovaks is very strong, and friendly relations are not limited to club life but extend to family and social relations. They are all materially comfortable. Many have their own businesses: the Slovaks are chiefly engaged in manufacturing wiring for airplanes, the Czechs own bakeries, candy shops and the like. Some Slovak factories employ up to

150 persons. The Brothers Marik bakery uses 25 tons of flour daily for its products, which are delivered by a fleet of 20 trucks. The ice cream factory of Mr. Valenta, who comes originally from Sobotka, delivers ice cream to retailers in 15 trucks. Even the new Czechoslovak immigrants—who arrived after February 1948—are doing well. They have an advantage over the old immigrants in that most of them are well educated and trained in technical fields. Many have their own cars and some have bought houses, naturally on the installment plan. Their relationship to the old immigrants and vice versa is very cordial: they engage in amateur theatricals in the societies and they deliver lectures. They send home the message that the people should not despair, that they have not been forgotten. A change is sure to come. The Czechs and Slovaks here will do whatever they can to help bring about that change as soon as possible.

"Jiri Cyclist" says that he came to America in August 1952. In Czechoslovakia he was a dentist; now he works as a welder in a farm machinery plant. He does heavy work, but he is content with his job in every respect and is trying hard to become an expert in his work and thus advance himself. As a dentist in Communist Czechoslovakia, he could make hardly enough to buy poor food, a new suit once a year, and an occasional trip to the mountains. As a worker in America, his salary is more than adequate for his needs. He owns a car, which he bought on the installment plan like most Americans; he has a large apartment, plenty of clothes, and says that he lives better than can all but the few privileged Communists whom the regime favors in Czechoslovakia. He compares conditions in Czechoslovakia and in America: the standard of living, according to his own observation, is about 1,000 percent higher in America. In contrast to Communist Czechoslovakia, which he left only in 1952, he sees no class differences in this country: one cannot distinguish a factory hand from a clerk or a professional man—they are all equally well-dressed and fed, and they all drive their own cars. He describes how the Czechoslovak exiles who left their country, fleeing the dictatorship, fare in America: they all do honest work and are satisfied. Many of them used to own and manage their own companies—today they do manual work, and are happy because they can live decent lives and are free. On the other hand, many of the refugees who used to work in factories in Czechoslovakia now have their own shops or farms.

He emphasizes that the exiles have not forgotten Czechoslovakia, that they think of the people at home all the time, that they know of their unhappy fate and would help them materially if the Communist regime did not make that impossible. He believes that the world cannot remain permanently divided into a world of the free and a world of slaves; he believes that Communism will be defeated as Nazism was, and that many refugees will go home.

Meetingitis

As evidenced by this cartoon spread published last August 23 in the Romanian satirical monthly, *Urzica*, even Communist workers can get fed up with the incessant round of talk which plagues almost all citizens behind the Iron Curtain. The countless meetings and discussions designed to improve work and insure the active participation of citizens in Communist plans succeed only in hampering efficiency, building resentment and apathy and in complicating simple issues.

First thing in the morning, a division meeting was cooked up for us . . .

. . . then our unit got together . . .



. . . right after that they held a short, punchy session—two hours long . . .

. . . towards noon they dragged us into an "operative" conference . . .

. . . which ended just in time for an unscheduled meeting at seven o'clock . . .



. . . the results of which became apparent later on in the evening.

Desen de VAL. MUNTEANU

— it was a day completely loaded with highly efficient meetings . . . none of which solved a blasted thing.



— Ce de sedinte, lucrare... nu ai facut nimic pentru a reduce din numarul lor?
— Ba de: am tinut o sedinta.

— Nothing but meetings . . . Haven't you tried to cut them down?
— Sure: we're calling a special meeting to do just that!

News Briefs

Amnesty on Parcels to Poland

The Polish customs and postal embargo on incoming parcels, imposed in January 1953, has been lifted, according to official Western sources.

The embargo applied primarily to food packages sent from the West, and to parcels containing pharmaceutical products. Polish authorities had repeatedly confiscated parcels containing drugs, or had returned them to the sender.

Polish post office regulations set a 500-gram weight limit on all outgoing parcels sent by private persons to Western countries. These parcels may contain only wooden articles and small metal ornaments; the dispatch of foodstuffs, textiles, shoes, and especially of gold and silver, is illegal. On parcels addressed to the Soviet Union, however, there are no restrictions on either contents or weight.

Government Attorneys Given New Power

A wide extension of authority has been granted to government prosecutors in Hungary under an edict issued July 30, 1953. Government attorneys not only prosecute cases in court, but now determine whether or not the court applies the law correctly. While under the old legal code the public prosecutor dealt only with criminal cases, under the new system his jurisdiction covers the administration of all law, and beyond the administration of justice he has power over all Ministries, institutions and organs of authority.

With this extension of the prosecutors' powers, the regime has added a third ring of control around its citizens. The first is the Communist Party organization with its organs of administration, the second is the Secret Police, and circumscribing all is the public prosecutors' office which now has the legal right to investigate and dispose of "everything pertinent to the order, independence and security of the People's Republic."

Russification Spelled Out

Members of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship League have contrived still another ingenious method of forcing the spread of the Russian language in their country. According to *Prace* (Prague), August 22, the Prague transportation works has been instructed to mount two cyrillic letters on cards posted in all streetcars and buses. The cards will be changed every week until all the letters of the cyrillic alphabet have been shown, and then they will be repeated.

In this way, Prague citizens will have little grounds for pleading unfamiliarity with the alphabet of the Russian language, and the tasks of agitators and Russian-language instructors will be eased.

Prace added incidentally that "the transport workers have pledged to replace the paper used up in this operation by stepping up the collection of scrap paper."

Moscow Seizes Radio Reins

In mid-September, the broadcasting networks of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland began transmitting through all their stations a daily half-hour program originating in Moscow.

The advertised purpose of these programs, which are prepared in the relevant languages, is to give the listener in the Soviet-dominated countries "a clearer picture of life in the Soviet Union." These are in addition to the regular broadcasts on Soviet Union affairs put out by the propaganda bureaus of the Satellite regimes. Why it has become necessary for the Russians to initiate their own propaganda broadcasts to the European Satellites is not yet apparent to Western observers.

New Security Police Unit

A new unit of the Securitate (State Security Police) is reported to have been set up to specialize in agricultural matters in Romania.

Known as "Securitatea A" for Securitatea Agricola, the new section is believed to have its headquarters in the former royal palace in Bucharest where the royal guard was once quartered. Offices of other branches of the section are in the "blocul Cretulescu" on the Calea Victoriei, and in the former Hotel Excelsior.

The main function of this new section is to carry out surveillance of the peasant population, to guard against sabotage of the agricultural plan and to assure that the peasants deliver their produce quotas to the State on time. It also keeps a sharp eye on the functionaries in the delivery reception centers and in the administration of the collective farms. Like the parent organization, "Securitatea A" is also charged with checking the political sentiments of the peasants toward the Communist government.

In recent months the personnel of the Securitate has been increased by about 10,000 men, most of them recruited from the UTM (Union of Working Youth.)

Prize Boner

The happiness of a Polish citizen who won six new books as a prize in a State lottery was short-lived. A detailed account of what he found when he inspected his new library acquisitions was given in *Gazeta Handlowa* (Warsaw), August 11:

"In four volumes of the Collected Works of Lenin, the following pages were completely blank: 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15. One hundred pages were missing from the book *Captain of the First Rank* by A. Nowikow-Prijob, making a gap between pages 264 and 361. After page 384 came 289, and after the latter, 361. This book has a total of 430 pages, good only for wrapping paper.

"The book *Rivers On Fire* by Wasilewska has nothing missing; on the contrary, it has two endings—one on page 271, which is the real ending, followed by a duplicate set of pages 241 to 271. Could it be that these pages were printed in surplus? Perhaps they will be missing in other copies of this book."

The irate prize-winner criticized the printing companies whose inspectors had passed and stamped all these volumes. He cited examples of other books he had seen with pages torn, missing, or out of order.

Reconstruction of Gdansk

A long-term plan for the development of the Polish seaport of Gdansk was outlined in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 2. Gdansk, a city with a present population of over 200,000, suffered war damages exceeded only by the Polish cities of Warsaw and Wroclaw. Almost 95 percent of the center of the city was destroyed. According to the Communist regime's blueprint, the central part of the city will be completely restored by 1960. In addition to this

reconstruction, new construction in the old architectural style will connect the old sections of Gdansk with the completely new northern suburb *Przedmieście Polnocne*.

Among the new buildings will be a "monumental House of Culture" dominating a main square where mass demonstrations and parades will be held. The largest of the new housing projects, the Grunwald Housing Center now being built in the northwestern section of the city, is designed to accommodate 60,000 people by 1960. About 3,300 rooms were occupied this year.

As a result of reconstruction to date, the port facilities of the city were "rebuilt and equipped with the most modern loading equipment." New electrified railroad lines now connect the Main Railroad Station with the New Port and run between Gdansk and the port of Gdynia.

Bad Form

An invitation to a meeting, sent to its members by the village council of Szentgal in Hungary, was denounced by local Communist Party functionaries as being too polite.

The offending notice, quoted in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), August 17, read:

"Comrade K.L., member of the Council of Szentgal, is hereby invited to a meeting to be held in the House of Culture on August 2, 1953, at 3 p.m. The agenda will include a report on (1) the activities of the Executive Committee and (2) the progress of the threshing and crop collection campaign. Although it is realized that in these busy times it will be difficult for Comrade L. to appear at the meeting, he is requested to come on time because the Executive Committee now needs the assistance of the members to carry out its important tasks in the community."

This invitation violated all rules of doctrinal etiquette, according to the district Party functionaries, who drew up the following points of criticism:

"1. The Executive Committee of Szentgal is opportunistic and liberal. The Committee displays a spirit of appeasement. When they use expressions such as 'although it is realized' and 'he is requested,' the Committee practically goes down on its knees begging the members to appear at the meeting.

"2. In addition to being opportunistic and liberal, the Committee of Szentgal is voluble and wordy. Why do they pepper the invitation with things which are evident anyhow? That these are 'busy times' is evident to everybody without the invitation of the Committee. And why do they have to ask the committee member to appear 'on time'? It is the duty of every member to go to meetings and to go on time. . . .

"3. Furthermore, there is a serious policy error in the text of the invitation, contained in the little word 'now.' For the tasks of the Executive Committee are always important. If they emphasize that 'now they need the assistance of the members to carry out the important tasks, etc.,' they imply that at other times the tasks are not so important, or that they are carried out without consulting the members of the council. Obviously both possibilities are intolerable. . . ."

Albanians Purge Professionals With "American" Training

Albanian graduates of the former American Vocational School (Shkolla Teknike) in Tirana are marked for complete liquidation, according to a recent Albanian escapee. The escapee, himself a graduate of the American School, taught in a high school in Gjinokastr. He escaped persecution by the Communist regime as long as he could hide his educational background, but fled the country once it was revealed.

The escapee pointed out that the present regime sends hundreds of students to the USSR and other Communist countries for specialized studies. He asserted that the "specialization" is confined almost entirely to a thorough indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism.

The Albanian press confirms that the educational emphasis lies here. To quote only one example, *Bashkimi* (Tirana), July 19, praised recent medical graduates particularly for their thorough training in Marxist-Leninism: "Students are taught many subjects and work in laboratories. But the students of the medical school distinguish themselves by their extraordinarily extensive preparation in Marxism-Leninism, which is taught very thoroughly."

Chinese Art Show in Bulgaria

The first exhibition in Bulgaria of Chinese painting and art opened in Sofia on August 17. According to a Radio Sofia broadcast: "The Chinese painters have masterfully reproduced the life of their people and the role of the Chinese Communist Party and their President Mao-Tse-Tung in the building up of their new Society." The exhibition is sponsored by the "Committee for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries" and is being held in its salon.

Lesson in Tactics

Alexi Trifoloff, formerly a butcher's apprentice in Sofia, was a man who knew how to take care of himself during the lean months of the war. Everything went smoothly until some good-for-nothing fellow whom he neglected in his "special food allotments," reported him. Alexi Trifoloff had a choice between the prison cell or escape. He chose the latter and became a partisan.

When he returned to Sofia with the "victorious troops" of the Communists, his faithfulness to the Party enabled him to climb to the rank of Major. One of his tasks was the "spiritual education" of his recruits, which he accomplished by the use of symbolic explanations.

One day he marched with his soldiers to Knjajevo. When they reached the summit of Witosch Hill, he decided to take advantage of the view of Sofia to deliver an improvised lecture.

"Comrade soldiers," he said, "do you see Sofia?"

"We see it."

"Do you see the Church of Alexander Nevski?"

"We do."

"Do you see the Mausoleum of the leader and teacher of the Bulgarian people?"

"We do."

"And do you see God, Comrade soldiers?"

"We do not see him, Comrade Major."

"Well, then. This means, Comrades, that there is no God. What can be seen exists, and what cannot be seen does not exist. Sofia, the Church of Alexander Nevski, the Mausoleum: they are all there. You have not seen God; therefore, he is not there. He does not exist. Understand?"

"We understand, Comrade Major."

Private Stoil Bojinoff, from the village of Dragalevci, requested permission from the Major to say something. This is the right of everyone in a "Socialist" state. Comrade Major granted him the permission. Stoil Bojinoff stood at attention in front of the soldiers:

"Comrade soldiers, do you see our Major, Comrade Alexi Trifoloff?"

"We see him."

"Do you see his boots, his sword strap?"

"We do."

"Do you see his head?"

"Yes, we do."

"Do you see his mind?"

"No, we do not see it."

"So it is, Comrade soldiers, as Comrade Major has told us: what one can see exists, what one cannot see does not exist. Understand?"

"We understand, Comrade."

Comrade Major stared at the sky intensely. Was he looking for God?

Russian Machine Doesn't Add Up

The Soviet Union represents herself as "the mother of progress" to her Satellites and promises them all the benefits of the latest technical advances. A woman who recently escaped from Czechoslovakia told of one experience with Russian gadgets.

In March, the woman went to the municipal office in her home town of Decin in order to pay her water tax. On a table she saw a machine of about 50 x 50 centimeters in size, made of wires and balls and resembling a child's abacus. When she asked the clerk what the object was supposed to be, he replied with a smile, "Oh, that is something for us to play with."

It turned out to be a Russian adding-machine which, at the insistence of the zealous office manager, had replaced the modern electric calculator formerly used in the accounting office. The clerk told the woman that office employees had to attend classes to learn how to operate the machine. He said that although operating it was "simple enough," the machine was very slow and made frequent errors.

When the woman returned two months later to pay another bill, the machine was still in the office. But when she asked if it was still being used, the clerk told her that the office employees had abandoned it. "We've gone back to doing arithmetic in our heads," he said. "It's quicker and more reliable."

The woman also saw the machine in other Decin offices. It is believed to be a primitive calculating machine called *Schoty*, which is widely used in the Soviet Union.

Class Struggle 1953

"As our daily experience proves, representatives of the People's Democratic State are frequently subject to assault from members of hostile village populations."

Thus the August 1953 Legal Bulletin of the Hungarian Supreme Court acknowledged a situation which is persistently ignored by the Hungarian press. The quotation is from Resolution no. 662/1953 on a recent case involving a peasants' attack on a forest ranger who "tried to take steps against the defendants to prevent acts endangering the interests of public supply and the crop collection."

Particularly during the harvest, government officials press the peasants beyond the limits of their endurance. This primitive form of retaliation is their only means of protest.

A Flaming Wet Rag

The complete works of State prize winners are automatically placed in all public and school libraries in Communist Czechoslovakia. *Dikobraz* (Prague), August 30, argued that the early works of certain currently approved writers should not necessarily be included, for "to encumber [children] in their school years with the evolutionary development of our artists is sheer folly."

Czechoslovak poet Vitezslav Nezval, the case in point, has run the gamut from surrealism to Socialist realism. A leader of the literary avant-garde movement in Czechoslovakia before the war, he subsequently became a leader of Moscow "Socialist" realism in his country and won several high awards, among them the State prize. The discrepancy between his early writing and his later works was described by *Dikobraz*:

"Mrs. Velisek, a young and contented mother of two children, was trying on a new dress while waiting for her 11 year-old daughter to come home from school. Soon the door opened and Eva, mother's pride, was home. She immediately noticed the new dress and breathed ecstatically, 'Oh, mummy, the dress is beautiful. You are so pretty, just like a—like a flaming wet rag!'"

"Mrs. Velisek gasped with astonishment. Eva realized that she had said something wrong and quickly added, 'Mummy, your dress is really nice; you look beautiful in it, like a watchspring in a horse's ear.'

"When mother was revived—the neighbor and his wife were trained in first aid—she asked weakly, 'For heaven's sake, child, where have you been? Where did you pick up this talk?' Eva looked innocently into her mother's pale face. 'Where have I been? It is Thursday and therefore I waited to see if Prague in a vacuum will fly south.'

"When they had revived the neighbor and his wife, Misa, the younger son, came home. Although he could not have guessed what had happened at home, the boy began to cry and sought refuge in his mother's arms. She tried to console him, but he wept and wept and pleaded, 'Mother, I want a sea horse, or better still an octopus, because it sheds tears of ink and that is all.'

"The valiant mother overcame her desire to faint again, gathered her children in her arms, and said, 'Quiet, my dears, quiet, your mother is with you. No-

body can harm you. Eat your supper and then tell me everything.' The children did not understand what she meant, but slowly the truth emerged. 'Goodness, mother, you worry too much,' lisped Eva. 'All this is in a book in our student library. Misa and I like it very much.' Mrs. Velisek took the book, opened it and read:

"Afternoon Without Memory

1.

"The umbrella woman flounders in couch fortifications Which are part of Thursday, when at four-thirty p.m. Prague in a vacuum will fly south.

2.

"I asked the sea horse; which is better, to dry up like a Leaf or spoil the most beautiful hours By trying to preserve them? And the octopus tells me: 'I shed ink tears and this is all.'

"Then she read the poem 'The Shirt' with this line: 'Beautiful like a flaming wet rag; beautiful like a watchspring in a horse's ear.'

"Mrs. Velisek had had enough. She brought the book to our editorial office. There she tossed on the table 'Volume IV of the Collected Works of Vitezslav Nezval'. The book bore the stamp of the student library in the Central School in Prague. We agree that it is unnecessary to hide from children the facts of life, but to encumber them in their school years with the evolutionary development of our artists is sheer folly. . . ."

Stocking Scandal in Estonia

Toeless shoes and seamless stockings have their place in Western fashion, but nylons with disappearing heels are far from popular in Estonia, according to *Sovetskaya Estonia* (Tallinn), August 15:

"The troubles of Ana Pavlovna Bukina started on April 17. That was the day she entered a store on Vana Kalamaya Street in Tallinn, and bought a pair of nylons. She naively thought nylons are made to be worn, and attempted to put them on. When the stockings tore and the heels ripped off, the salesman shrugged his shoulders and said, 'Why complain, Citizen? What can I do? If you wish, go to the factory and complain there.'

"Resolutely, Bukina went to the factory to see the director. 'Of course, I recognize our product,' he said. 'It is item 91-K. Perhaps you don't know how to put on nylon stockings. Our technical specialist, Comrade Shampal, will instruct you right now.' Bukina was told to put on a pair of stockings for Shampal; the expert could find no fault in her method. The expert said, 'Leave the stockings here for investigation. We will let you know.'

"Later on, Bukina was summoned to report to the director's office. Solemnly her feet were measured and she was presented with a new pair of stockings. Bukina decided to try them on right in the office. With a rip, off came the heels, while the director and Shampal looked on. 'Let us go to the warehouse,' suggested Shampal. 'You can choose whatever kind you want.' On the way to the factory stockrooms, he whispered in Bukina's ear: 'Don't take item 91-K. They are hopeless. I never get

them for my wife and I've warned all my friends. . . .'

"But the pair Bukina chose at the warehouse lasted only one day; then the heels came off. The determined young lady went to the Central Inspection Office of State Trade. An investigation was launched. The experts of the Trade Ministry found that 'the stockings 91-K have hidden technical defects which make prolonged wear impossible. An inquiry made at the place of manufacture revealed that item 91-K will not be produced any more. . . .'

"Some time later Bukina met Shampal, the specialist, in the street. 'Hello, my young friend,' he said. 'What did you say? Item 91-K? Of course we still make it.'

"Out of curiosity, Bukina visited several shops and found that all of them carried large stocks of 91-K. 'Complaints?' said the manager of one of the shops. 'Naturally; there are hundreds of them. It is a disgrace that such stockings are put on sale.' 'They disintegrate in your hands,' said the saleswoman at another shop. 'Everybody complains about 91-K,' said another shop manager. 'It's best to demand your money back, not to try and exchange them. You never know what you will get.'

"Obviously, Bukina will never buy item 91-K. But what about other, less experienced buyers?"

"Americans Killed Stalin"

In a speech made at a recent Communist Party meeting in the Czechoslovak town of Vizovice, the Americans were charged with the death of both Stalin and Gottwald, according to a refugee report. The report added that in a discussion after the meeting, one of the Communists remarked that the Americans must have managed to penetrate into the Kremlin in Moscow and Hradcany in Prague in order to accomplish their crime.

Dress Competitions

"Fashion show" would sound too bourgeois to unspoiled proletarian ears, reasoned Czechoslovak authorities, and so *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), September 10, announced that "International Dress Competitions" will be held between September 19th and 27th in various Czechoslovak cities. Besides the Czechoslovak textile and leather industries, the clothing industries of Hungary, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic will participate. Each country will present 48 models of work, sport and house clothes, costumes, coats and evening gowns.

Feminine Farmhands

Peasants' daughters born in 1934, 1935 and 1936 will be drafted into the "Service for Poland" youth brigades for two and a half months between September and November of this year, according to Radio Warsaw, August 7. They will be employed on farms to replace youths returning to schools, and will receive the same payment as workers on State *kolkhozes*.

Price of Progress

Jokes at the expense of the Soviet occupiers are endemic in the Satellite countries. This one was told by a Czechoslovak refugee:

"During a session of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, the delegates were invited to a dinner. One of them, while eating his soup, found a piece of a rubber tire in it and was just about to blurt out his indignation when he noticed an MVD guard watching him closely. Being dialectically trained, Comrade delegate immediately switched the subject and shouted:

"'Progress, Comrades, progress all along the line. Only 35 years have elapsed since we seized power and already the automobile has replaced the horse. . . .'"

Research Projects on Eastern Europe

Prepared by the National Committee for a Free Europe

The studies listed below have recently been completed by members of the Mid-European Studies Center. They are available in limited quantities and may be obtained by writing the Mid-European Studies Center, 4 West 57th Street, New York 19, New York. Bulk prices are available on request.

Communist Europe, by C. E. Black, (1953) 80 pages, printed pamphlet. Included is a brief survey of the economic and political background of the area prior to World War II, with emphasis on the problems common to the Balkan and central European states. There is a discussion of the programs and parties in the period 1920-1939 and a description of the rise and consolidation of Communist power. Price \$1.00.

Mid-Europe: A Selective Bibliography, compiled by Jirina Sztachova, (1953) 197 pages, printed booklet. There is no comparable bibliography listing both primary and secondary books on the historical, political, economic and cultural development of this area in any language. Full citations are given for 1693 titles, chiefly English and French, largely referring to available twentieth century publications. It is divided into two parts, the first on subjects for all of the Mid-Europe, the second on individual countries, including the Balkans, the Baltic States and the Soviet Union. Paper \$2.00; bound \$3.00.

Readings on Contemporary Eastern Europe, edited by C. E. Black, (1953) 352 pages, printed booklet. This selection of readings brings together brief accounts of the main problems of eastern Europe, as well as interpretations and statements of policy representing a variety of viewpoints including the Communist. They are not intended to form a comprehensive survey of all aspects of the development of the area during the past generation but are rather readings which supplement and illustrate the general accounts that are available. Price \$1.50.

Poland: History and Historians: Three Bibliographical Essays, by Bernard Ziffer, (1952) 107 pages, printed booklet. Dr. Ziffer, a lawyer by profession, here provides, with notes, an account of Polish historiography and a critical biography of the chief works, periodicals, and learned societies, particularly for the interwar period of this century. Price \$1.50.

Blueprint for a Red Generation, by William Juhasz, (1952) 101 pages, printed booklet. A simply written, straightforward, and specific account of the philosophy, methods, and practices of Communist education. The Russification of language, the indoctrination of youth, and anti-Western propaganda make a case study of Communist methods. The subject of this clinical study is Hungary, whose educational system has been completely revised by the Communists in the years since 1947. This compact brochure makes clear the means and the meaning of the Communist program for educating youth. Price 50 cents.

Agricultural Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia, by Ladislav Feierabend, (1952) 125 pages, printed booklet. A documented history of the agricultural cooperatives that were so vital to the economy of democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 until their recent subversion and collectivization by the Communists. Price \$1.00.

Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1945-1951, (1952) 138 pages, mimeographed pamphlet. Listed in this study are treaties and agreements entered into by the Soviet Union with its Satellites and by the Satellites among themselves. To show how the dominant position of the Soviet Union determines the general conditions of economic exchange, various types of agreement are represented by at least one selected treaty. Translations by members of the Mid-European Law Project. Price \$2.00.

Economic Planning in Hungary Since 1938, (1951) by L. D. Schweng, 80 pages, printed booklet. A study of recent economic changes in Hungary by the former Chief of Research for the National Bank of Hungary. He analyzes in detail the Three Year Plan adopted in 1947, and the Five Year Plan put into operation by the Communists in 1950. Price \$1.00.

Fuel and Power in Captive Middle Europe, by Jan H. Wszelaki, (1952) 63 pages, printed booklet. A documented analysis of the fuel and power resources of seven Satellite countries, and of present plans for developing these resources, with an appraisal of Communist control. The author, a specialist in economic affairs, was a member of the Polish diplomatic service from 1918 to 1945. Price \$1.00.



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